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Abstract
Mindfulness- and acceptance-based interventions for social anxiety incorporate
techniques such as self-compassion and values articulations. Self-compassion has been
shown to reduce anticipatory anxiety in students with high social anxiety but the impact
of values-affirmation has not yet been explored. Additionally, past research suggests that
values-affirmation may foster self-compassion. Three studies were conducted to explore
whether values-affirmation, too, reduces anticipatory anxiety (related to an upcoming
speech task) and to evaluate whether self-compassion is a mechanism of change. In study
one, participants (N = 93) were randomly assigned to a self-compassion manipulation, a
values-affirmation condition, or a control condition. After controlling for baseline
differences, there were no significant differences across conditions on anticipatory
anxiety. Study two (N =121) compared a standard values-affirmation (in the context of a
memorable experience) to the modified values-affirmation (in the context of a mistake)
used in study one and determined the values-affirmation used was not representative of a
typical values-affirmation manipulation. The purpose of study three (N = 209) was to
compare a standard values-affirmation manipulation and control group on their levels of
anticipatory anxiety related to an upcoming speech task. Participants were preselected for
high versus low social anxiety to compare these groups. The results showed that selfaffirmation reduced anticipatory anxiety for those with low social anxiety only, and this
effect was mediated by state self-compassion. This research further supports the selfcompassion account of self-affirmation (Lindsay & Creswell, 2014) and adds to the
literature showing that individual vulnerability differences can serve as a significant
moderator of self-affirmation effects.
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Reducing Anticipatory Anxiety: Does Values-affirmation Increase Self-Compassion
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is a common and persistent anxiety disorder
(Beedso-Baum et al., 2012; Baxter et al., 2013; Kessler et al., 2012) associated with many
problematic outcomes (Beesdo et al., 2007; Mullaney & Trippet, 1979, Liebowitz et al.,
1985). Mindfulness and acceptance-based interventions (MABI) show growing support for
treating people with SAD (Stefan et al., 2018; Norton et al., 2015; Dalrymple & Herbert,
2007; Kocovski et al., 2013), and have been suggested as an alternative treatment option
for anxiety disorders (see Keng et al., 2011 for review; Eifert & Forsyth, 2005; Eifert et al.,
2009). Rather than trying to alter negative cognitions and emotions directly as in traditional
cognitive behavioural interventions, MABIs place an emphasis on encouraging behavioral
shifts in the face of cognitive or emotional distress (Herbert et al., 2014).
The current research focuses on two techniques from within the mindfulness- and
acceptance-based camp that may be helpful for the treatment of SAD: 1) self-compassion
(SC), which is derived from Buddhism and mindfulness, and 2) values articulation, which
will be represented through a values-affirmation task borrowed from the self-affirmation
literature. Inducing self-compassion has been found to effectively reduce anticipatory
anxiety for those with high social anxiety (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017). The main purpose
of the current research was to determine whether, like self-compassion, values-affirmation
is effective in reducing anticipatory anxiety, and whether self-compassion plays a
mediating role, such that values-affirmation increases self-compassion, which in turn
decreases anticipatory anxiety.
Social Anxiety
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Social anxiety disorder (SAD), formerly known as social phobia, is recognized by
the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013) as fear and avoidance of
social situations due to possible negative evaluation from others. It is characterized by
persistent and irrational fears of being judged by others, specifically in three circumstances:
public speaking or performances (typically the most distressing), social interactions (e.g.
speaking with a stranger), and being observed in public (e.g. eating).
Cognitive models of SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995) connect social anxiety with three
key attributes: 1) a tendency to focus on negative social information (i.e. criticism), 2)
perfectionistic standards in social performance settings, and 3) a high degree of public selfconsciousness. Not only do individuals with SAD interpret neutral social events as negative
and indicative of their shortcomings, but they also have a memory bias in favor of this
interpretation bias (Hertel et al., 2008; Brozovich & Heimberg, 2008). Overall, people with
SAD have a biased tendency to recall emotionally negative events.
People with SAD are markedly self-conscious in public settings and preoccupied
with a need to appear perfect and have flawless interactions (Flett et al., 2012). When they
are treated negatively by others, this memory consumes their thoughts (Nepon et al., 2011).
Importantly, people with high levels of social anxiety are also known to be more selfcritical (Cox et al., 2002), which has been found to be a predictor of poorer response to
CBT (Rector et al., 2000). In fact, the fundamental main thematic fear in SAD is that “the
self is deficient” (Moscovitch, 2009). Individuals with high social anxiety attach less
importance to their positive characteristics (Moscovitch et al., 2009) and have a more
negative self-view, even when they have performed objectively well in a given social
situation (Alden & Wallace, 1995). Cox et al. (2004) found self-criticism to be significantly
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associated with lifetime occurrence of social anxiety disorder, even after controlling for
current levels of emotional distress, mood, anxiety, substance use disorders, depression,
and trait levels of neuroticism. Their study was conducted with clinical samples,
characterized by demoralization, distress and perceived need for help; however, they
determined that the presence of social anxiety disorder alone was enough to account for the
heightened levels of self-criticism that were observed. In line with this, people with social
anxiety disorder have also been shown to display higher scores in fear of self-compassion
and of receiving compassion compared to a control group (Merrit & Purdon, 2020).
Data from Ontario’s Mental Health Supplement study found that SAD was
connected to clear dissatisfaction and low functioning in terms of quality of life (Stein &
Kean, 2000). It is also associated with dropping out of school (Stein & Kean, 2000), and
with an increased risk of depressive disorders, substance-use disorders, and cardiovascular
disease (Ruscio et al., 2008; Kessler, 2003). There are high comorbidity rates with other
mental disorders in general, ranging between 69% and 99% (Chartier et al., 2003;
Leichsenring et al., 2003; Schneier et al, 1992). People with SAD have lower positive
functioning (Weeks & Heimberg, 2012), experience fewer positive emotions, less meaning
in life, and lower self-esteem (Kashdan & McKnight, 2013). They perceive themselves to
face more difficulties and failures and report lower intrinsic motivation in working toward
their purpose (Kashdan & McKnight, 2013).
Importantly, SAD is associated with a lowered tendency to seek help (Ruscio et al.,
2008; Kessler, 2003; Keller, 2003, Beesdo et al., 2007). According to a study done by
Ranta et al. (2009), only 1 in 5 adolescents with SAD had sought out help from a mental
health professional. Other studies have reported numbers as low as 5% of people with SAD
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seeking adequate help (Weiller et al., 1996). Naturally, social anxiety hinders help-seeking
behaviours from those with SAD as they likely experience heightened concerns about
social evaluation from both healthcare professionals, and peers. Clark (2001) has noted that
a key issue for those with SAD is an excessive internal self-focus which magnifies their
belief that others will reject them if they were to not behave properly. When people with
SAD do seek out therapy, a notable barrier is client motivation. McAleavey et al. (2014)
found that 60.5% of clinicians agreed that when client motivation was lower at the start of
therapy, they were less likely to thrive through cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). CBT is
the typical treatment for SAD (Kaczkurzin, 2015); however, after incorporating high dropout rates (about 10-20%), about half of patients show minimal, if any, response to treatment
(Eskildsen et al., 2010) and most continue to experience lingering symptoms after CBT
(Rodebaugh et al, 2004; Dalrymple & Herbert, 2007). Occasionally, clients in CBT even
show worse symptoms (McAleavey et al., 2014).
Perhaps self-help approaches that aim to adjust the way they view themselves
(lower self-criticism) as well as manipulate their focus of attention, such as mindful
exercises and workbooks (Fleming & Kocovski, 2013), would be a useful tactic to offer
strategies for this population. Further, McAleavey et al. (2014) suggest incorporating
techniques that would improve client motivation. For example, incorporating values work
could help to improve client motivation (Grumet & Fitzpatrick, 2016), as personal values
are innately motivating (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003).
Mindfulness and Acceptance Based Interventions
Mindfulness has received significant attention in recent years; in fact, this has been
referred to as the “Mindfulness Revolution” and it has been described as being the secret to
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happiness (Pickert, 2014). The “third-wave” mindfulness- and acceptance-based
interventions emphasize present-focused awareness in which the individual views their
current experience(s) with acceptance and compassion, rather than engaging in avoidance,
control, or suppression (Hayes, 2004; Williams, 2010). For example, in the context of
anxiety disorders, mindfulness- and acceptance-based interventions aim to facilitate
observation of symptomatic processes (e.g. increased heartrate or sweaty hands) without
overidentifying with said processes and reacting to them in ways that are more destructive
than helpful (e.g. avoidance; Roemer et al., 2008). A common example of an exercise used
in mindfulness- and acceptance-based interventions is awareness of breathing. The task is
to simply focus on the physical sensation of one’s own breath, and if attention drifts to
external stimuli or thought, then the task is to redirect one’s focus on breathing once again.
Mindfulness meditation has been incorporated into larger behavioral interventions
for those experiencing anxiety disorders and shows promising results, with people having
lower levels of anxiety symptoms as well as higher quality of life (Chen et al., 2012;
Khoury et al., 2013; Serpa et al., 2014). Mindfulness- and acceptance-based interventions
also show promising results for treating people with SAD (Goldin et al., 2009; Bogels et
al., 2006), and acceptance and commitment therapy, a type of mindfulness- and
acceptance-based intervention, has been found to be equally effective as CBT in both group
and individual settings (Kocovski et al., 2013; Craske et al., 2014). These therapies
emphasize the acceptance of internal experiences, as well as values articulation and valuesconsistent action (Hayes et al., 2012).
Acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT), a type of MABI, focuses on
psychological flexibility, defined as “the ability to contact the present moment more fully
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as a conscious human being, and to either change or persist when doing so serves valued
ends” (Hayes et al., 2004, p. 5). There are six processes involved in psychological
flexibility: 1) acceptance (willingness to have private internal experiences, as opposed to
avoiding one’s thoughts and feelings); 2) cognitive defusion (not allowing literal language
to dominate the direct experience, as opposed to being “fused” to a certain thought or
belief, such as “I am a failure”); 3) contact with the present moment (maintaining
awareness and focus on the current moment, as opposed to ruminating on the past or
worrying about the future); 4) self-as-context (maintaining a flexible view of one’s self
based on the context); 5) values (awareness of things that are important to you and that help
direct your actions) and 6) committed action (similar to values; involves the articulation of
firm behaviors that will help to move an individual toward their values, as opposed to
inaction, impulsivity or avoidance), all of which are believed to initiate change during
treatment (Ruiz, 2012). Along with acceptance, values are leaned on heavily in acceptance
and commitment therapy.
Although CBT is the ‘gold standard’ for treating anxiety disorders, mindfulnessand acceptance-based therapies offer a promising alternative treatment option for some
people. Studies on acceptance and commitment therapy have shown growing evidence for
treating a wide range of psychological issues, including anxiety disorders (Craske et al.,
2014; Swain et al., 2013; Ruiz, 2010 for review). Open trials investigating ACT in both
individual and group settings for SAD have shown significant improvement in social
anxiety symptoms and quality of life (Dalrymple & Herbert, 2007) and significant
decreases in experiential avoidance (Ossman et al., 2006). Internet-delivered ACT
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programs have even shown to be effective in reducing social anxiety symptoms (Ivanova et
al., 2016).
Although there is growing empirical support for mindfulness- and acceptance-based
therapies, they are not always effective, especially when one is specifically looking to
minimize one’s symptoms of anxiety (Strauss et al., 2014). Acceptance and commitment
therapy (ACT) suggests that forming a connection with personal values can motivate
people intrinsically to build mindfulness-skills (Hayes et al., 2012; Hayes et al., 2011).
ACT has a core process of “committed action”, requiring engagement in activities that
align with personal values. There is supporting evidence for the values component in ACT
benefitting people experiencing anxiety disorders, showing it to be helpful in lowering
psychological distress and enhancing well-being and quality of life (Michelson et al.,
2011). Michelson et al. had participants with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) undergo
acceptance-based behavioural therapy (ABBT), during which they were encouraged to
discuss the values that are central to them and to think about how anxiety and avoidance
behaviours have impeded values consistent living. The researchers determined that ABBT
lead to significant increases in valued living. Research on values, such as that done by
Michelson et al., typically looks at the effect of values articulation on values-consistent
activities. It is not clear, however, whether values clarification tasks have a significant
impact (e.g., West et al., 2013; Berghoff et al., 2017) outside of value-related behaviors
(Karremans, 2007; Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001). This was considered in the current
studies, by borrowing a values-affirmation task from the self-affirmation literature to
explore whether writing about an important value reduces anticipatory anxiety towards an
unrelated upcoming speech task.
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Values
In acceptance and commitment therapy, values are defined as “…verballyconstructed, globally-desired life directions” (Hayes et al., 2001, p. 235). Unlike goals,
values have no ‘end’; they help guide behavior in an ongoing process. They are meant to
orient people toward purposeful actions, even when they are experiencing negative
emotions (Hayes et al., 2012). Identifying values in therapy has been found to increase
values-oriented behaviors (Yadavia & Hayes, 2009; Chase et al., 2013, Paez-Blarrina et al,
2008). There is also literature from other areas of psychology showing that identifying and
exploring one’s personal values has the ability to alter behavior and attitude (Epton et al.,
2014; Freijy & Kothe, 2013; Harris & Epton, 2009; Lehmiller et al., 2010).
A technique used in acceptance-based behavioural therapies is a values articulation,
in which clients are encouraged to bring important values to the forefront of their mind
when approaching challenging situations, rather than focusing on their anxiety related to
the situation. Values clarification tasks provide a source of inspiration and life purpose
(Hayes & Duckworth, 2006), and aim to motivate behavior and encourage acceptance in
the presence of painful emotions and experiences (Hayes et al., 1999). A lack of values
clarity can impede value-guided living and is related to a variety of negative outcomes,
including suicidal ideation, experiential avoidance, general psychological distress, and
anxiety (Bahraini et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 2010). Values are suggested to offer a more
stable “compass reading” than internal experiences (Hayes et al., 1999) when guiding
behavior in personally relevant domains. For example, consider a situation in which
somebody with high social anxiety is deciding whether to give a presentation. It may be
more beneficial to consider one’s values about learning and education or personal growth
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and development, than to base one’s decision on the anxious feelings (internal experiences)
that arise from the thought of presenting.
Written values clarification tasks (also known as self-affirmation tasks) have been
shown to promote the elaboration and expression of values-consistent behaviours (Maio et
al., 2001; Sagiv et al., 2011) and help people regulate negative cognitive and affective
responses (Cohen et al., 2007). Researchers speculate that values articulations may work to
lower the impact of distress, as it becomes less important than pursuing valued action; for
example, people have been found more willing to experience pain following a values
articulation that connected pain to a valued action (Paez-Blarrina et al., 2008). Several
studies show support that value-guided action increases behavioural flexibility, helping
people to better endure aversive situations (Branstetter-rost et al., 2009; Ciarrochi et al.,
2011; Gutierrez et al., 2004). This speaks to why values articulations, in which people
focus on their values rather than negative internal experiences (anxiety), are a helpful
addition to therapy for those experiencing social anxiety. Problems in value clarity, on the
other hand, are related to negative outcomes, including experiential avoidance, general
psychological distress, and anxiety (Bahraini et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 2010).
In social psychology, values-affirmation is a means of self-affirmation that serves a
protective function when one is faced with a threat (McQueen & Klein, 2006). Most of the
research has focused on the impact of values-affirmation on social psychological areas such
as bias (e.g., affirming core values reduces self-serving bias; Sherman & Kim, 2005); the
influence on distress and psychological functioning requires further clarity. Creswell et al.
(2005) examined whether a values-affirmation would minimize psychological stress linked
to an interpersonal challenge and determined that self-affirmation buffers against stress

VALUES-AFFIRMATION AND SELF-COMPASSION

10

reactivity to social evaluation. In contrast, although Czech et al. (2011) did find that people
who lived a life consistent with their values had less anxiety towards a stress task, they also
found that a values-affirmation exercise did not reduce anticipatory or post-task anxiety.
Perhaps a values-affirmation task would be specifically effective for those who have the
most to gain from it, similar to self-compassion.
Self-Affirmation
“Self-affirmation is the active affirmation of some important aspect of one’s selfconcept” (McQueen & Klein, 2006, p.300). The notion that people are motivated to
maintain self-integrity is central to self-affirmation theory; this corresponds to the image of
oneself as able to control important adaptive and moral outcomes in one’s life. Threats to
this evoke psychological threat; however, when people affirm their general self-integrity,
defensiveness diminishes (Sherman & Cohen, 2006).
Self-affirmation has shown to have a wide range of benefits; for example, it reduces
various forms of threat (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Cohen & Sherman, 2014), reduces
negative consequences of chronic stress (Cohen et al., 2006; Creswell et al. 2013), helps
instill confidence in one’s ability to reach one’s goals (Zhao & Nan, 2010), and buffers
against physiological stress responding (Creswell et al., 2005). It also helps people to
recognize their vulnerabilities and appreciate that bad things may happen (Klein et al.,
2011; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Tesser, 2000). Generally, people focus their attention to
threats (Pratto & John, 1991). When self-affirmed, people can perceive daily stressors in
the context of the bigger picture (i.e. using higher mental construal; Schmeichel & Vohs,
2009; Wakslak & Trope, 2009), thus having less effect on one’s psychological state
(Sherman et al., 2013). Self-affirmation can help people to see that they have integrity and
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that regardless of any difficulties or stressors they may face, life overall is okay. For
example, when self-affirmed participants (those who had wrote about an important value)
were required to do a spontaneous speech task with social evaluation, they no longer
showed signs of elevated cortisol (Creswell et al., 2005). This finding may have been a
result of viewing the stressor in a larger picture of “things that truly matter for my
adequacy” (Creswell et al., 2005). Interestingly, affirmations nurture an approach
orientation to threat, as opposed to avoidance from threat, with self-affirmed participants
reporting a threatening domain as more important to them compared to non-affirmed
participants (Cohen et al., 2007).
Stress often arises from events that call into question people’s sense of adaptive
adequacy – how well they perceive themselves as able to meet life’s demands and control
personal outcomes (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Therefore, affirming one’s values could
buffer against stress by allowing one to attach one’s sense of adequacy in an alternative
domain where it is not in question. Self-affirmed individuals are found to narrate adversity
in a way that maintains self-adequacy and aids in their adaptive engagement with threats
(Cohen et al., 2009; Cook et al., 2012). Just as self-compassion inductions are most
effective for those who have the most to gain from them (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017;
Leary et al., 2007), people who benefit most from implementing self-affirming narratives to
daily stressors are those with the greatest number of daily hassles (Keough & Markus,
1998); for example, perhaps somebody with high levels of social anxiety.
Self-Affirmation Mechanism of Effect
The mechanism of effect behind self-affirmation remains open for debate
(McQueen & Klein, 2006; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). There are currently two main
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theoretical perspectives pertaining to how self-affirmation exerts its effects. The first is the
self-resources account (i.e. raising self-esteem and self-regulatory strength; Shmeichel &
Vohs, 2009; Sherman & Hartson, 2011), which states that self-affirmation boosts one’s
self-image for coping with self-threats (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Though, self-affirmation
researchers contend that self-affirmation should not merely be equated with bolstering
people’s self-esteem (e.g., McQueen & Klein, 2006). The second is the transcending-self
account, in which self-affirmation facilitates ones transcending self-image concerns by
increasing other-directed feelings. For example, Crocker et al. (2008) compared a valuesaffirmation condition with a control condition on 18 affective states. The valuesaffirmation condition was significantly higher in 12 of the items (love, joyful, giving,
empathic, connected, sympathy, grateful, proud, content, clear, vulnerable, critical,
humble). Further, they found that out of the 18 measures, the feelings ‘loving’ and
‘connected’ were the only ones that explained the effect of a values-affirmation on
acceptance of threatening health information. Recently, a novel self-compassion account of
self-affirmation, which offers a combination of the self-resources and transcending-self
perspectives, was proposed by Lindsay and Creswell (2014), in part inspiring this study.
The self-compassion account is discussed in more detail later.
There are two common types of self-affirmation manipulations: 1) value
affirmations and 2) attribute affirmations. In value affirmations, one affirms oneself by
highlighting values that are personally important (e.g., Cohen et al., 2007); in attribute
affirmations, one affirms oneself by highlighting one’s characteristics (e.g., Cohen et al.,
2000). To affirm the self, an event does not need to foster a feeling of overall excellence;
rather, it must merely promote a sense of adequacy within one’s personal value (Cohen &
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Sherman, 2014). Personal values have been described as the internalized standards one uses
for self-evaluation (Rokeach, 1973). Often, people affirm themselves through writing about
their connections to others (Shnabel et al., 2013) and to purposes that extend beyond their
own person (Crocker et al., 2008).
Likely the most popular technique (McQueen & Klein, 2006) used within selfaffirmation studies is the values-affirmation. In this exercise, participants are asked to rank
a set of values from most to least important (e.g. friends and family, learning and
education, religion and spirituality, etc.) and then write about their top ranked value. They
are asked to discuss why that value is important to them, or how they have tried to live up
to that value in the past. To compare, a control condition typically discusses an
unimportant value and writes about why it may be important to others (Crocker et al.,
2008).
Self-Compassion
Self-compassion (SC) originated in Buddhist thought, which places an emphasis on
truly knowing and understanding the nature of oneself. There are three interrelated aspects
of SC, each with a dichotomous construct: 1) self-kindness during trying times, such as
failure, rather than being self-critical; 2) common humanity and viewing oneself as part of
the larger human experience, as opposed to viewing oneself in isolation or alone in their
suffering; and 3) mindfulness, in which one views both good and bad personal experiences
and feelings in balance and with mindful awareness, rather than over-identifying with
negative affect (Neff, 2003a).
Research with healthy individuals has consistently established the benefits of SC
showing that it promotes many adaptive qualities including life satisfaction, resilience and
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wellness, emotional intelligence, self-determination and perceived competence (Neff,
2003a), goal mastery and self-improvement motivation, intrinsic interest (Neff et al., 2005),
personal initiative and making changes required for a more productive and fulfilling life
(Neff et al., 2007), learning-approach goal orientation (Akin, 2008), adaptive coping, as
opposed to avoidance (Costa & Pinto-Gouveia, 2013), a greater ability to cope with
negative emotions and negative feedback (Neff et al., 2007; Heffernan et al., 2010; Waring
& Kelly, 2019), use of first person plural pronouns (“we”; Barnard & Curry, 2011), social
connectedness (Akin & Akin, 2015), and emotional balance (Leary et al., 2007). Research
has also determined SC to be negatively associated with various detrimental affective states
including anxiety, depression, self-criticism, self-judgment, rumination, and perfectionism
(Neff, 2003a; Neff & Vonk, 2009; Dundas et al., 2017), anxiety level after considering
weaknesses (Neff et al., 2007), self-referring words (“I”), fear of failure (Neff et al., 2005;
Neff et al., 2018), and post-traumatic stress and panic following traumatic events (Zeller et
al., 2014). SC theory posits that the psychological security required to reduce defensiveness
in face of threat can be increased without needing to raise self-esteem or bolster self-image
(Leary et al., 2007). SC helps to reduce the anxiety that comes with the self-criticism
following negative events, so that one no longer needs to defend against it (Neff et al.,
2007).
A commonly used technique for manipulating SC is a writing exercise in which
individuals discuss a negative life event, whether it be in one’s personal life, work life or
social life. They are directed to write about an event that made them feel particularly bad
about themselves, as SC has been found to be most relevant in times of shame and selfcriticism (Neff, 2003b). Participants receive three prompts, each relating to one of the
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three components of SC. The self-kindness prompt urges them to express concern and
understanding to themselves, in such a way they might express concern for a friend in the
same situation; the common humanity prompt asks them to list ways in which others may
have had similar experiences; the mindfulness prompt encourages their detailing of the
events and feelings to be as balanced as possible. Using this technique, Breines and Chen
(2012) found that inducing SC increased the belief that shortcomings can be changed, the
desire to make amends, effort put forth studying for a test following failure, and motivation
to improve a personal weakness. In their study, SC influenced people to engage in positive
responses following negative events.
Arch et al. (2014) determined that people who underwent a SC manipulation
consisting of metta (loving-kindness) meditation showed an increase in levels of SC
relative to a control group. Additionally, these individuals displayed lower levels of
salivary alpha amylase (sAA) following the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Kudielka et al.,
2007), signifying an inhibited sympathetic system response, which has been connected to
lower defensiveness (Arch et al., 2014). A decrease in levels of sAA following a SC
induction demonstrates individual’s lower levels of anxiety in response to a socially
threatening situation (the TSST). This study reveals that SC training produces greater
effects beyond increasing one’s level of SC. They went beyond correlational research,
providing support for the idea that SC may have a more instrumental relationship among
certain psychological states, such as anxiety.
Individuals with high social anxiety tend to engage in extreme post-event
processing (Brozovich & Heimberg, 2008; Helbig-Lang et al., 2016), something SC has
been shown to effectively reduce. Blackie and Kocovski (2017) found that among
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participants with high social anxiety, a SC induction following a speech task led to lower
post-event processing the next day and increased participants’ willingness to engage in
future social situations.
Arch et al. (2018) compared a SC induction among a clinical sample of people with
social anxiety disorder (SAD) to a healthy control (HC) group. Given that people with SAD
engage in post-event processing they were interested in determining whether SC was
helpful in recovery from social stressors. Participants were put through two social stressors
(a speech task, and self-evaluation and feedback task) before completing a written SC
induction. Their findings showed that individuals with SAD displayed greater increases in
state SC and greater decreases in state anxiety following the induction relative to the HC
group. Similarly, SC has been found to be an effective strategy for those with high levels of
social anxiety, compared to those with low social anxiety (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017), in
reducing anticipatory anxiety towards a social speech task. It seems as though SC has an
important role in reducing anxiety, especially among those who need it the most.
Sure enough, research has found that SC inductions are more effective for those
who are initially low in SC (Arch et al., 2014). For example, Leary et al. (2007) showed
that low self-compassionate individuals who underwent a SC induction showed an increase
in perception of similarity to others, while those high in SC were not influenced by the SC
induction. In the same study, Leary et al. also found that SC served as a buffer against
negative emotions when people engaged in an event involving undesirable self-evaluation.
Moreover, participants who underwent the SC manipulation attributed the negative event to
“the kind of person [they] are” to a greater degree than the control group. The control
group showed a positive correlation between taking responsibility and experiencing
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negative emotions; this correlation was not present for those in the SC condition. This
study demonstrates that those who receive SC training are less defensive (as depicted by
increased accepting of responsibility) and show lower levels of distress (as depicted by no
correlation between taking responsibility and later negative emotions) compared to a
control group.
Self-Affirmation and Self-Compassion
As previously mentioned, the fundamental main thematic fear in social anxiety
disorder is that “the self is deficient” (Moscovitch, 2009), noting that people with social
anxiety are highly self-critical. Mindfulness-based approaches (such as self-compassion)
and self-affirmation are both constructs that address patterns of self-criticism (Creswell et
al., 2007; Lannin et al., 2018), both of which have also been proposed as possible
mechanisms through which expressive writing works. Mindfulness involves accepting
one’s inner experiences, consequently increasing cognitive flexibility and decreasing
unwanted thought patterns such as self-criticism (Baer et al., 2006). Self-affirmation
interventions address negative thought patterns (such as self-criticism) in a different way –
through reminding oneself of valued personal aspects (attributes or values) in order to
protect self-worth (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). This is associated with decreased stress and
increased well-being (Creswell et al., 2007), as well as intentions of reducing self-criticism
(Bucchianeri & Corning, 2012).
Recall that there are currently two theoretical perspectives on self-affirmation – the
self-resources perspective, and the transcending-self perspective. Lindsay and Creswell
(2014) proposed a novel self-compassion perspective of self-affirmation that connected the
self-resources account and the transcending-self account for a more complete explanation
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of self-affirmation. According to the self-compassion perspective, self-affirmation boosts
one’s self-image by raising self-directed feelings of sympathy and love, and lowering
feelings of vulnerability and criticism (Neff, 2003a; Leary et al., 2007); therefore,
increasing self-compassion is one form of boosting one’s self-image (self-resources
perspective). It is also associated with increased feelings of love and connection (the selftranscendence perspective; Neff, 2003a; Crocker et al., 2008). They propose, however, that
the self-image boost is about feeling more compassion toward the self (rather than the
common self-esteem boost that is suggested; Neff & Vonk, 2009) and that these
compassionate feelings generated by self-affirmation are not other-directed (as proposed by
the self-transcendence perspective).
Lindsay and Creswell’s (2014) study showed self-affirmation to increase selfcompassionate feelings, and that these feelings promote pro-social behaviors. They found
support for the compassionate feelings being self-directed, specifically. Moreover, selfaffirmation enhanced feelings of self-compassion greater among those initially low in selfcompassion. This is similar to research on self-compassion, which has demonstrated selfcompassion training to be more effective among those initially low in self-compassion
(Leary et al., 2007). The effect of self-affirmation writing on self-compassion may also
explain why studies on self-affirmation struggle to provide evidence that the mechanism of
change is simply state self-esteem or positive mood (Schmeichel & Martens, 2005;
Sherman & Cohen, 2006; McQueen & Klein, 2006). Lindsay and Creswell acknowledge
the need for research to clarify how self-compassion and self-affirmation processes are
entangled.
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Both self-affirmation and self-compassion are social tactics that touch on your
relation to others: self-compassion through the idea of a common humanity and selfaffirmation through relating to an important value in such a way that makes you feel
connected to others or to being a significant member of a society. Research suggests that
values-affirmation effects may be driven by tendencies to write about why their important
value makes them feel connected to others (Shnabel et al., 2013). Perhaps it is the feeling
of common humanity and connecting the self to others, compassionately, that aids to buffer
against self-threatening events and negative emotions.
Further, Stefan (2019) found that approach coping strategies in general increased
self-compassion, which in turn assisted in reducing social anxiety; avoidance coping had
the opposite effect. As mentioned earlier, affirmations nurture an approach orientation to
threat as opposed to avoidance from threat. For example, self-affirmation assists in the
process of acknowledging one’s weaknesses and the fact that negative experiences are a
part of life; in other words, self-affirmation aids in acceptance, which is a noteworthy
aspect of approach coping strategies, along with problem solving and seeking support
(Stefan, 2019). This further supports the notion that self-affirmation, being an approach
coping strategy, may be a means to increase self-compassion.
Present Research
The current research was designed to explore the relationship between selfaffirmation and self-compassion within the domain of social anxiety. A values-affirmation
task is not only a self-affirmation task, which is noted as an effective tactic for combatting
patterns of self-criticism, something central in social anxiety (Creswell et al., 2007;
Bucchianeri & Corning, 2012), but it is also a values-based strategy, which has been noted
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as an important component to add to behavioural interventions for anxiety disorders (Hayes
et al., 2012). Therefore, the current research sought to determine whether a valuesaffirmation would be effective in reducing anticipatory anxiety for those with high levels of
social anxiety. Whereas Lindsay and Creswell (2014) focused on increasing prosocial
behaviour, this study is focusing on decreasing psychological distress, thus enhancing our
understanding of these two approaches as therapeutic techniques to be utilized within
mindfulness- and acceptance-based interventions. The goal of the present research was to
determine whether self-affirmation is effective in reducing anticipatory anxiety. Further,
the present research aims to further explore the self-compassion account of selfaffirmation. The main hypothesis is that self-affirmation will reduce anticipatory anxiety
towards a speech task by increasing participants’ levels of state self-compassion.
Three studies were conducted to investigate whether self-affirmation led to reduced
levels of anticipatory anxiety, and whether this effect was mediated by an increase in state
self-compassion. Study one compared the effects of a self-affirmation, self-compassion and
a control condition on anticipatory anxiety pertaining to an upcoming speech task. Study
two compared the modified self-affirmation manipulation used in study one to a standard
self-affirmation manipulation. Study three compared a standard self-affirmation condition
to a control condition on anticipatory anxiety related to an upcoming speech task and
investigated state self-compassion as a mediator. Study three also preselected participants
with high versus low social anxiety to determine if self-affirmation is more effective for
those with high social anxiety than it is for those with low social anxiety, similar to what
has been found for self-compassion (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017).
Study One
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Study one investigated the difference between a self-compassion condition (SC), a
self-affirmation condition, and a control condition in levels of anticipatory anxiety
pertaining to an upcoming speech task. It was hypothesized that both SC and selfaffirmation groups would have reduced anticipatory anxiety compared to the control group.
Further, it was expected that both experimental conditions would lead to increased levels of
state self-compassion which in turn would lead to reduced anticipatory anxiety towards the
upcoming speech task (see Figure 1).
Method
Participants
There were 93 undergraduate students between the ages of 17-25 (mean age=19.07;
62% female; 56% white, 25% Asian, 4% black, 15% other) enrolled in an introductory
psychology course at Wilfrid Laurier University that participated in this study. During the
debrief, all participants were asked if they were suspicious about whether they would have
to give the speech or not. No participants had to be excluded due to suspicion. Participants
were randomly assigned to a SC condition (n=30), self-affirmation condition (n=32), or a
control condition (n=31). The participants received 1.0 credit towards their course grade for
partaking in the study.
Materials
Beck Depression Inventory. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI – II; α = .91;
Beck, Steer, & Brown 1996) is a 21-item self-rating scale that assesses individual’s
negative thoughts and feelings during the past two weeks. Each item is rated on a 4point Likert scale (0 = not at all feeling à 3 = strong feeling). This revised edition
incorporates items to measure severe depressive symptoms that may require hospitalization
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Figure 1.
Hypothesized Self-Compassion Mediation Model

State
SelfCompassion

SC/selfaffirmation
Condition

Anticipatory
Anxiety
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(i.e. 0 =”I do not feel I am worthless” à 3 = “I feel utterly worthless”). Scores range from
0 to 63, with higher scores signifying higher levels of depression. The BDI has been found
to have good reliability regardless of the population (α = .92 for outpatients; α = .93 for
college students), good test-retest reliability at one week (α = .93) and has good construct
validity (Beck, Steer, & Brown).
Social Phobia Inventory. The Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000)
was used as a measure of social anxiety in studies 1 and 2, and as a pre-screen measure of
social anxiety in study 3. The SPIN is a 17-item self-rating scale that measures
individual’s level of social anxiety over the past week within each of the symptom domains
of SAD: fear (e.g., “talking to strangers scares me”); avoidance (e.g., “I avoid speaking to
anyone in authority”); and physiological arousal (e.g., “Sweating in front of people causes
me distress”). Each item is rated by the participant on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = not at all

à 4 = extremely). Scores range from 0 to 68, with higher scores signifying higher levels of
social anxiety. The SPIN has been shown to have good test-retest reliability, internal
consistency, and validity (Connor et al., 2000).
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale. The Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS;
Mattick & Clarke, 1998) was used as a measure of anxiety in studies 1 and 2, and as a prescreen measure for level of social anxiety in study 3. It is a 20-item self-rating measure on
which respondents rate their experiences in social domains associated with social anxiety
(e.g., “I find it difficult mixing comfortably with the people I work with”; “I feel I’ll say
something embarrassing when talking”). Each item is rated by the participant on a 5-point
Likert scale (0 = not at all true of me à 4 = extremely true of me). Possible scores range
from 0 to 80, with higher scores representing higher levels of social anxiety. The SIAS has
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been shown to be particularly reliable for undergraduate students (α = .99) and people with
SAD (α = .93) and has a strong test-retest reliability (r = .94) at four and twelve weeks
(Mattick & Clarke, 1998).
Self-Compassion Scale. The Self-Compassion Scale (SCS; Neff, 2003a) was used
as a baseline measurement of participants’ level of SC. The SCS is a 26-item self-rating
scale composed of six subscales: self-kindness (e.g., “I try to be loving towards myself
when I’m feeling emotional pain”); self-judgment (e.g., “I’m disapproving and judgmental
about my own flaws and inadequacies”); common humanity (e.g., “when I feel inadequate
in some way I try to remind myself that feelings of inadequacy are shared by most
people”); isolation (e.g., “when I think about my inadequacies, it tends to make me feel
more separate and cut off from the rest of the world”); mindfulness (e.g., “when something
painful happens I try to take a balanced view of the situation”); and over-identification
(e.g., “when something painful happens I tend to blow the incident out of proportion”).
Each item is rated by the participant on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = strongly disagree à 5 =
strongly agree). The negative subscale items (self-judgment, isolation, and overidentification) are reverse-scored. Total scores were calculated by adding each item;
possible scores range from 26-130. The SCS has been shown to have consistently high
reliability across various populations (Total scale α = .91; all subscale αs ≥ .76;) and has
strong predictive, convergent, and discriminate validity (Neff, 2016).
Self-Esteem. A one-item self-esteem scale was used: “I have high self-esteem”.
Participants responded to this statement on a 7-point scale (1 = not very true of me à 7 =
very true of me).
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Subjective Units of Distress Scale. The Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS;
Wolpe, 1969) is a one-item question concerning the level of distress the participant is
feeling at that moment, pertaining to their upcoming speech task (0 = no distress à 100 =
highest distress possible). The SUDS has shown to have convergent and discriminant
validity, concurrent validity, and predictive validity (Daeho et al., 2008).
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State Form. The Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory – State Version (STAI-S; Spielberger et al., 1983) was used to determine the
participants’ level of state anxiety pertaining to their upcoming speech task. The STAI-S is
a 20-item self-rating questionnaire concerning how anxious a participant feels at that
current time. A sample question is “I feel strained”, which the participant rates on a 4point scale (1 = not at all à 4 = very much so). Total scores can range from 20-80, with
higher scores signifying higher levels of state anxiety. The STAI-S has high internal
consistency (ranging from .83 to .92; Kaplan & Smith, 1995), as well as good test-retest
reliability. It is used on both clinical and non-clinical groups (Spielberger et al., 1970).
Anticipatory Social Behaviours Questionnaire. The Anticipatory Social
Behaviours Questionnaire (ASBQ; Hinrichsen and Clark, 2003) is a 12-item measure that
examines trait anticipatory processing such as preparing for the social event or imagining
worst-case scenarios. The questions were modified to refer to the speech task that
participants were required to do in the experiment (e.g., “I made a conscious effort to not
think about the speech”; “I reminded myself of things I should not do”). Participants rated
their response on a 4-point scale (1 = never à 4 = always). The ASBQ has high internal
consistency (α=.88) and good reliability (α=.87; Mills et al., 2013).

VALUES-AFFIRMATION AND SELF-COMPASSION

26

State Self-Compassion Scale – modified. The state Self-Compassion Scale (SSCS) was modified from Neff’s SCS – short version (Raes et al., 2011; included in
Appendix A as it is a modified scale) to refer to present moment feelings of selfcompassion, rather than feeling of self-compassion generally. It is comprised of 12
questions regarding how they feel when they look back on the mistake that they wrote
about during the study (e.g., “I am trying to take a balanced view of the situation”; “when
thinking about my experience, I am obsessing and fixating on everything that went
wrong”). Participants responded on a 5-point scale (1 = almost never à 5 = almost
always). Unfortunately, no state self-compassion scale existed at the time of this study and
so a modified measure had to be used (see Appendix A for modified measure).
Manipulation check. The manipulation check consisted of four questions that
participants responded to on a 7-point Likert scale (1= not at all à 7= extremely): 1) “how
important to you is the value you chose to write about?”; 2) “in general, I try to live up to
this value.”; 3) “how self-critical were you when writing about your mistake?”; 4) “to what
extent did you write about your mistake compassionately?”
Procedure (see Figure 2)
Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to better understand thought
processes surrounding important values. Demographic measures and baseline measures
(depression, self-compassion, social anxiety) were administered to ensure that there were
no baseline differences between conditions.
Participants were all required to rank a set of 12 values from most (ranked number
1) to least (ranked number 12) important. These values are as follows: artistic skills, sense
of humor, relationships with friends/family, spontaneity/living in the moment, social skills,
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Figure 2.
Study One Procedure
Baseline Measures
(BDI, SPIN, SIAS,
SCS, SE)

Rank set of values

Self-Compassion
(top value; mistake)

Values-Affirmation
(top value; mistake)

Control
(bottom value; mistake)

Manipulation Check

State Measures
(SUDS, STAI-S,
ASBQ, S-SCS

Note. SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale; STAI-S = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory;
ASBQ = Anticipatory Social Behaviours Questionnaire; S-SCS = State Self-Compassion
Scale
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athletics, musical ability/appreciation, physical attractiveness, creativity, academic skills,
romance, religion, other. Participants were then randomly assigned to the SC manipulation
(n=30), self-affirmation manipulation (n=32), or a control condition (n=31). See Appendix
A for conditions.
Self-compassion manipulation. The self-compassion manipulation was a
derivative of that used by Leary et al. (2007); however, it was revised to focus on important
values to remain consistent with the self-affirmation condition. Participants were
instructed to write about a negative situation that they had previously experienced within a
particularly important domain. Discussing a mistake was used as part of the manipulation
as Neff (2003b) has noted that self-compassion is most relevant in circumstances that
provoke feelings of shame and self-criticism. Specifically, the instructions read: “Consider
your top ranked value (the value most important to you). Think about a time when you
made a mistake pertaining to this important value.” The participants were provided with
three prompts intended to touch on each of the three facets of SC. The self-kindness
prompt asked them to “write a paragraph expressing kindness to [themselves] in the same
way [they] might express kindness for someone close to [them]”; the common humanity
prompt instructed participants to “list some of the ways in which other people have
experienced similar events to the one [they] described”; the mindfulness prompt requested
participants to “list the emotions [they] felt during this and event and explain (in as
balanced a manner as possible) why [they] felt that emotion”.
Self-affirmation manipulation. The self-affirmation manipulation was based on a
standard manipulation used in previous research (Lindsay & Creswell, 2014), though it was
revised to include writing about a mistake rather than merely a memorable experience in
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order to maintain consistency with the SC condition. Participants were also instructed to
write about a mistake pertaining to their top ranked value. They were further prompted with
four items commonly used in self-affirmation manipulations, although revised to be within
the context of writing about a mistake. The prompts were as follows: “briefly state 3 or 4
times in which you made a mistake related to this important value”; “describe the mistake
that was most exceptional, influential to you, or important to you”; “explain in full why this
value in important”; and “identify your top two reasons why it’s important to you”. Typical
values-affirmations ask participants to recall 3 or 4 experiences related to their important
value and to discuss why their value is important and how they have lived up to this value
in the past. They don’t typically work with mistakes made in the context of important
values; however, the goal was to make the conditions as similar as possible.
Control condition. The control condition was intended to account for any effects
resulting from writing about a negative event, but without inducing any sense of selfcompassion or self-affirmation. Participants received three similar prompts to the SC
condition; though, their prompts had no relation to self-compassion. The prompts were as
follows: “write a paragraph describing your role in this event”; “who else was involved in
this event?”; and “describe your feelings about this event”. The control condition was also
meant to control for writing about a value in general. Rather than writing about a mistake in
their top ranked value, they wrote about one in their bottom ranked value. They were also
asked to “Explain in full why this value is important to others. Identify the top two reasons
you believe this value to be important to others.”
Following the manipulation phase, there was a brief manipulation check regarding
how important the value they wrote about was to them. All participants then underwent an
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anxiety induction, which was implemented through a three-minute impromptu speech task.
Participants were told the following: “This portion of the study examines how people talk
about important values. This is an important topic because research has shown that how
people discuss important values is correlated with whether they adhere to specific values
and live by these values in everyday life.” Participants were told they will be speaking in
front of the group (ranging from 1-5 people, depending on how full the research slot is).
Following the anxiety induction, participants were asked to complete the SUDS, the
STAI-S, and the ASBQ to determine their current state of anxiety. Lastly, they completed a
state self-compassion measure, modified from the SCS scale (Neff, 2003a). Upon
completion of these measures, participants were told that they were not actually required to
give the speech.
Data Analysis
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to determine any
significant effects of the manipulation (SC vs. self-affirmation vs. control) on their state
anxiety or state self-compassion (SUDS, STAI-S, ASBQ, and S-SCS). Hayes’s Process
(Hayes, 2018; version 3) was used to run mediation analyses to determine whether selfcompassion and self-affirmation conditions had higher levels of state self-compassion and
whether this reduced anticipatory anxiety.
Results
Baseline Measures
Participants’ social anxiety, depression, self-compassion and self-esteem were
measured across conditions (see Table 1). There were no significant differences at the
multivariate level, F (2,90) = 1.40, p = .20. However, upon closer investigation, univariate
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Table 1
Baseline Descriptive Statistics by Condition
Self-Compassion
Measure

M

SD

Self-Affirmation

Control

M

SD

M

SD

F
(2,89)

p

Social Anxiety
SPIN
14.17a

10.83

20.06

13.91

23.40b

15.01

3.67

.03

SIAS

19.70a

14.22

24.13

17.28

32.07b

16.25

4.61

.01

SelfCompassion
SCS

83.10a

12.93

77.00

16.29

71.27b

15.73

4.62

.01

Depression
BDI

10.37

7.44

13.78

9.26

15.97

11.74

2.58

.08

Self-Esteem
Single-item
Self-Esteem

4.90

1.39

4.56

1.41

4.27

1.39

1.59

.21

Note. SIAS= Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory. BDI =
Beck Depression Inventory. SCS = Self-Compassion Scale. SE = Self-Esteem Scale.
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analyses revealed significant baseline differences in social anxiety, SIAS: F (2,90) = 4.61,
p = .012 and SPIN: F (2,90) = 3.67, p = .030, and in self-compassion, SCS; F (2,90) = 4.62,
p = .012. Participants in the control condition had significantly higher scores on the SIAS
and the SPIN compared to the SC condition (p =.012 and p=.030, respectively).
Participants in the control condition had significantly lower levels of self-compassion
compared to participants in the SC condition (p=.009). These measures were controlled for
when conducting future analyses.
Manipulation Check
A manipulation check was conducted to determine how important the chosen value
was to the participant, how much they try to live up to that value, and how self-critically
and self-compassionately participants wrote about their experiences pertaining to their
important value (see Table 2). There were significant differences across conditions in how
important they rated their value, F (2,90) = 33.39, p < .001, how much they try to live up to
their value, F (2,90) = 23.11, p < .001, how self-critical, F (2,90) = 9.46, p < .001, and how
self-compassionate, F (2,90) = 13.98, p < .001, they were when writing about their
experience.
The self-affirmation and SC conditions considered the value they chose to write
about as significantly more important compared to the control condition (both p <.001);
they did not differ from one another in how important the value was to them (p =.59). The
self-affirmation and SC conditions try to live up to the value more compared to the control
condition (both p <.001); once again, they did not differ from one another (p =.96). The
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Table 2
Manipulation Check Items by Condition
SC

SA

Measure

M

SD

Importance

6.40a

Live up to

Control
M
SD

M

SD

F
(2,90)

p

1.28

6.62a

.75

3.55b

2.46

26.65

.000

6.17a

1.12

6.19a

1.23

3.77b

2.23

17.54

.000

Self-critical

4.90a

1.47

5.34a

0.97

3.84b

1.70

7.18

.001

Selfcompassion

4.88a

1.38

5.31a

1.15

3.52b

1.63

11.94

.000

Note. SC = self-compassion condition; SA = self-affirmation condition
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self-affirmation and SC conditions were significantly more self-critical (p <.001 and p
=.004, respectively) and self-compassionate (both p <.001), compared to the control
condition. They did not differ from one another on either measure (p =.22 and p =.21,
respectively).
Effect of Condition on State Anxiety
A MANCOVA was run using the STAI-S, ASBQ, SUDS and S-SCS as
dependent variables. Social anxiety (SIAS and SPIN) and self-compassion (SCS) were
entered as covariates due to baseline differences. The MANCOVA showed no significant
differences, F (2,86) = 0.22, p =.99, Λ = .010.
Four ANCOVAs (see Table 3) were run to look at the effect of condition on the
four dependent measures: general distress (SUDS); state anxiety (STAI-S); anticipatory
processing (ASBQ); and state self-compassion (S-SCS). Social anxiety (SIAS and SPIN)
and self-compassion (SCS) were entered as covariates. After controlling for these baseline
measures, there were no significant differences between conditions in general distress,
SUDS; F (2, 86) = .24, p = .79, η2 = .006, state anxiety, STAI-S; F (2, 87) = .27, p = .77, η2
= .006, anticipatory processing, ASBQ; F (2, 87) = .05, p = .95, η2 = .001, or state selfcompassion, S-SCS; F (2, 87) = .26, p = .78, η2 = .006.
Hayes’s Process was used to run a moderation analysis (model 1) using ‘condition’
as the predictor variable, social anxiety (baseline SPIN score) as the moderator, and anxiety
as the outcome variable (SUDS, STAI-S, ASBQ) to determine whether either of the
experimental conditions, self-affirmation or self-compassion, was more effective for people
who score certain levels of social anxiety. The SPIN was used as the moderator as it covers
a range or social anxiety, whereas the SIAS focuses on social interaction. This decision is
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Table 3
Anticipatory Anxiety and State Self-Compassion by Condition (includes covariates)
Self-Compassion

Self-Affirmation

Control

Measure

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

df

SUDS

40.79

27.05

51.47

26.13

54.74

24.93

STAI-S

42.67

12.75

47.84

13.21

51.65

ASBQ

27.20

6.07

29.41

8.02

S-SCS

28.67

7.00

25.94

7.65

F

p

2,86

.24

.79

14.38

2,87

.28

.76

30.39

9.17

2,87

.04

.96

24.42

6.80

2,87

.27

.76

Note. SUDS= subjective units of distress scale; STAI-S= state-trait anxiety inventory –
state; ASBQ= anticipatory social behaviors questionnaire; S-SCS= state self-compassion
scale. F and p values are the ANCOVA results.
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consistent with other literature, which used the SPIN as the primary measure of social
anxiety (Kocovski et al., 2013). Baseline self-compassion was entered as a covariate due to
baseline differences between conditions. Neither moderation model using ASBQ or STAIS as the outcome measures showed significant differences in anticipatory processing or
state anxiety between conditions among different levels of the moderator (baseline social
anxiety). The moderation model using SUDS as the outcome measure was significant, F (6,
85) = 9.31, p < .001, R2 = .40. For those with low baseline social anxiety: the difference
between the control and self-affirmation group was not significant, b = -7.03, t (85) = -.86,
p = .39; the difference between the control and SC condition was approaching significance,
b = -15.28, t (85) = -1.92, p = .06. For those with low baseline social anxiety, those in the
SC condition had a 15.28 unit decrease in distress compared to the control group. For
those with average baseline social anxiety: there was no significant difference between the
control group and the self-affirmation condition, b = -1.34, t (85) = -.25, p =.81, or the SC
condition, b = -1.01, t (85) = -.17, p = .87. For those with higher baseline social anxiety:
there was no significant difference between the control condition and the self-affirmation
condition, b = 4.34, t (85) = .63, p=.54, or the SC condition, b = 13.26, t (85) = 1.40, p =
.17.
A mediation analysis was done to test whether state self-compassion (S-SCS)
mediated the effect of condition on anticipatory anxiety (SUDS, STAI-S, ASBQ); baseline
differences in social anxiety (SPIN & SIAS) and self-compassion (SCS) were included as
covariates. The models were significant; however, once looking closer this significance
was just driven by the significant paths of the covariates. None of the other paths were
significant.
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After controlling for baseline differences in social anxiety and self-compassion,
neither the self-affirmation condition nor the SC condition showed significantly different
levels on the S-SCS, t (86) = -.62, p = .24 and t (86) = .02, p = .98, the SUDS, t (86) = .26,
p = .80 and t (86) = -.40, p = .69, the STAI-S, t (86) = -.18, p = .86 and t (86) = -.69, p =
.50, or the ASBQ, t (86) = .30, p = .77 and t (86) = .30, p = .77, compared to the control
condition.
Discussion
It was hypothesized that the self-affirmation and self-compassion (SC) conditions
would have lower anticipatory anxiety compared to the control condition. Further, selfcompassion was expected to mediate this effect with both experimental conditions having
higher state self-compassion compared to the control condition, which would lead to lower
anticipatory anxiety.
There were baseline differences between the SC condition and control condition in
social anxiety and self-compassion, such that the SC condition had lower baseline levels of
social anxiety and higher baseline levels of self-compassion. Once the SPIN, SIAS and
SCS were added as covariates there were no significant differences in anticipatory anxiety
or state self-compassion between conditions. Inducing self-compassion has been found
previously to reduce anticipatory anxiety (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017); however, that
study had preselected participants for high versus low social anxiety. They found an
interaction effect such that a self-compassion induction led to lower anticipatory anxiety
than a control condition for those with high social anxiety, not for those with low social
anxiety. Given the present study did not preselect participants based on their trait social
anxiety, we were not able to replicate those findings. Perhaps had this study included a
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sample of participants with high social anxiety, who were shown to be more receptive to
self-compassion training, we may have replicated those results.
Surprisingly, the moderation model actually showed that the self-compassion
condition displayed significantly less distress than the control condition for those with low
social anxiety and had no significant effect on those with high social anxiety. This is
opposite to what would be expected based on previous findings (Harwood & Kocovski,
2017). Unlike the previous study, the current study had the personal mistake contextualized
within their most important value. This choice was made to maintain consistency with the
self-affirmation condition; however, most self-compassion manipulations are not based on
mistakes within their most important value. In response to distressing social events,
individuals with social anxiety disorder report symptoms such as re-experiencing,
avoidance, and hyper-arousal, which are characteristic of those found among people with
PTSD (Erwin et al., 2006). It may be that writing about a mistake within the domain of
your most important value overrides the beneficial effects of the self-compassion induction
for those with high social anxiety, specifically, despite still showing a beneficial effect for
those with low social anxiety.
Contrary to our hypotheses, there were no significant differences in anticipatory
anxiety between the self-affirmation and control condition. One plausible reason for this
may be that the self-affirmation condition was modified to make it more similar to the SC
condition, which may have disrupted the authenticity of the self-affirmation condition.
Whereas typical values-affirmations have participants write about a top-rated value and
discuss how they live up to it, the current study had participants write about their top-rated
value in the context of a negative experience – a mistake. The choice to modify the self-
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affirmation manipulation to discuss a mistake was made in order to ensure the selfcompassion and self-affirmation manipulations were as similar as possible. It is possible
that having participants write about mistakes they have made within a personally important
value may have a detrimental effect on their psychological state, rather than help buffer
against psychological distress (anxiety), as was originally hypothesized. Self-affirmation
relates to self-integrity and thinking about a mistake in a personally important value may
threaten self-integrity. Although focusing on a mistake may have threated self-integrity, it
still did not lead to higher distress than the control condition, who wrote about a mistake in
an unimportant value. In fact, although there were no significant differences, the pattern of
results was in line with the hypothesis in that those in the self-affirmation condition showed
lower levels of general distress (SUDS) and state anxiety (STAI-S) compared to the control
condition.
One final interesting finding to note is the manipulation check showed that
participants in the self-affirmation and self-compassion conditions perceived themselves to
be more self-compassionate than the control condition when writing about their mistake.
The fact that the self-affirmation condition perceived themselves as more selfcompassionate may stem from the fact that self-compassion is most relevant during times
of shame of self-criticism (Neff, 2003a) and their writing about a mistake may have
invoked such feelings, or it may be a result of the self-affirmation component specifically.
Participants in the self-affirmation and self-compassion conditions also perceived
themselves to be more self-critical than the control condition. This makes sense, given that
both of the experimental conditions were instructed to write about a mistake in the context
of a personally important value, whereas the control condition wrote about a mistake in a
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value that had no significance in their life. It is likely that participants are less self-critical
when discussing something that holds no value in their life.
Study Two
The second study was conducted online in an effort to explain the results found in
the first study. Specifically, the primary aim was to determine whether the self-affirmation
manipulation was a fair representation of self-affirmation. Typically, self-affirmation
manipulations require participants to write about positive personal experiences within the
domain of an important value (Ferrer et al., 2017; Meier et al., 2015). In study one,
participants in the self-affirmation condition wrote about a negative experience (a mistake)
in order to increase internal validity by keeping the procedure as similar as possible to the
self-compassion condition, which typically involves writing about a mistake (Leary et al.,
2007; Harwood & Kocovski, 2017). The purpose of this second study was to compare a
traditional self-affirmation exercise with one that focuses on a mistake. It was expected that
the self-affirmation condition in the context of a mistake would lead to higher distress and
more negative affect compared to a standard self-affirmation manipulation.
Although there are mixed results regarding whether self-affirmation directly
influences affect (e.g., Harris & Napper, 2005; Weisenfeld et al., 1999), the focus of the
current study was to investigate whether there were differences between a standard selfaffirmation (SA-standard) condition and a mistake self-affirmation (SA-mistake) condition
on 18 affective states following the manipulation phase. General distress was also
measured. It was hypothesized that the SA-mistake condition would lead to lower positive
affect, higher negative affect, and higher distress compared to the SA-standard and control
conditions.
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Method
Participants
There were 121 undergraduate students between the ages of 17-25 (average age
19.88; 76% female; 61% White, 17.5% Asian, 7.5% Black, 14% other) enrolled in an
introductory psychology course at Wilfrid Laurier University that participated in this study.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. The first was a standard
self-affirmation condition, in which they wrote about a memorable experience in a
personally important value (n =39). The second was a mistake self-affirmation condition
(n=41), in which they wrote about a mistake within a personally important domain. The
third was a control condition (n=41). The participants received credit towards their course
grade for partaking in this online study.
Materials
The baseline measures used were the SPIN, SIAS, BDI, SCS and a one-item SelfEsteem scale. The SUDS and modified SCS were used again as dependent measures. The
Affective States Measure was also used as a dependent measure.
Affective States Measure. An Affective States Measure (borrowed from Crocker et
al., 2008) was used to assess general mood. The Affect Scale contains 18 items examining
the following feelings: love, joyful, giving, empathic, connected, sympathy, grateful,
proud, content, clear, vulnerable, critical, humble, selfish, scared, sad, confused, and angry.
Participants rated their response on a 4-point scale (1 = not at all à 4 = very much so).
State Self-Compassion Scale. The state Self-Compassion Scale (S-SCS) was
modified from Neff’s SCS – short version (Raes et al., 2011) to assess present moment
feelings of self-compassion, rather than feelings of self-compassion generally. Whereas the
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modified version in study one specified feelings towards a speech, this version specified
feelings towards a past experience.
Manipulation check. The manipulation check consisted of six questions that
participants responded to on a 7-point Likert scale (1= not at all à 7= extremely): 1) “how
important to you is the value you chose to write about?”; 2) “in general, I try to live up to
this value.”; 3) “looking back, how self-critical were you when writing about your personal
event?”; 4) “to what extent did you write about your personal event compassionately?”; 5)
“how positive was the event?”; and 6) “how negative was the event?”
Procedure
Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to better understand
thoughts and feelings associated with personally important values. Baseline measures (i.e.
social anxiety, depression, self-compassion) were administered to ensure that there were no
baseline differences between conditions. Participants were all asked to rank a set of 12
values before being randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 1) standard selfaffirmation (n = 39); 2) mistake self-affirmation manipulation (n = 41); and 3) control (n =
41).
Standard self-affirmation manipulation. The self-affirmation (SA-standard)
manipulation was a standard technique used in previous work (Ferrer et al., 2017; Meier et
al., 2015). Participants were instructed to recall personal experiences pertaining to their top
ranked value. They were prompted to describe three or four memorable experiences, to
describe the most exceptional or influential experience, and to explain why this value is
important to them.
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Mistake self-affirmation condition. The mistake self-affirmation condition (SAmistake) was derived from the standard self-affirmation manipulation; however, it was
revised to discuss a mistake rather than just any experience. The prompts were kept as
similar as possible to the standard self-affirmation condition, while being made to focus on
a mistake. Participants in this condition were prompted to recall three or four mistakes they
have made pertaining to their most important value, to describe the most exceptional or
influential mistake that they made, and to explain why the value is important to them.
Control condition. The control condition was intended to account for any effects
resulting from writing about a value in general and writing about a mistake in general.
Rather than writing about a memorable event in their top ranked value, they wrote about a
mistake in their bottom ranked value. They were asked to “describe 3 or 4 times in which
[they] made a mistake related to this value”, to “describe the mistake that was most
exception or influential” to them, and to “explain in full why this value is important to
others. Identify the top two reasons you believe this value to be important to others.”
Following the manipulation phase, there was a manipulation check regarding how
important the value they wrote about was to them, how much they try to live up to that
value, how self-critically and how self-compassionately participants wrote about their
experience, and how positive or negative their experience that they wrote about was.
Participants were then asked to complete the SUDS to depict the highest level of
distress they experienced when writing about their personal experience. They also
completed the Affect Scale to determine to what extent they felt each of the 18 feelings
when writing about their experience (e.g., love, connected, critical, sad, etc.). Finally, they
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completed a state self-compassion scale to determine how self-compassionate they felt in
that moment discussing their personal experiences.
Data Analysis
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to determine any
significant effects of the manipulation (SA-standard vs. SA-mistake vs. control) on
participant distress and state self-compassion (SUDS, S-SCS) and on their affect (Affect
Scale).
Results
Baseline Measures
Participants’ social anxiety, depression, self-compassion and self-esteem were
measured across conditions (see Table 4). There were no significant baseline differences
found on the SIAS, SPIN, SCS, BDI or self-esteem scale (all F < 1). Additionally,
participants selected similar values across conditions (relationships with friends and family
chosen as top value 46-51% of the time).
Manipulation Check
A manipulation check was conducted to determine how important the value they
chose to write about was to them, how much they try to live up to their value, how selfcritically or self-compassionately they wrote about their personal experience, and how
positive and negative the experience that they wrote about was (see Table 5). There were
significant differences on all measures (all p <.01).
As expected, the control group ranked the value as significantly less important to
them and tried to live up to their value significantly less than both the SA-standard and the
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Table 4
Baseline Measures by Condition
Control
SD

SA-standard
M
SD

SA-mistake
M
SD

Measure

M

F
(2,118)

Depression

14.95

9.17

16.33

11.58

14.07

10.30

.48

.62

SIAS

29.76

14.66

32.68

14.00

32.68

16.51

.39

.67

SPIN

23.88

13.09

24.36

12.93

26.12

16.82

.27

.76

Selfcompassion

75.37

14.37

74.62

20.09

79.32

13.46

.99

.38

Self-esteem

4.22

1.17

4.18

1.54

4.32

1.47

.10

.90

Note. SIAS= Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory.

p
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Table 5
Manipulation Check Items by Condition
Control

SA-standard

SA-mistake

Measure

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

F
(2,116)

Importance

3.98a

2.37

5.77b

1.35

6.22b

1.24

18.97

.000

Live up to

4.32a

2.08

5.38b

1.46

6.10b

1.02

12.64

.000

Self-critical

3.49a

1.73

3.89ab

1.93

4.76b

1.73

5.32

.006

Selfcompassion

3.78a

1.63

4.82b

1.49

4.71b

1.63

5.10

.008

Positive

4.20a

1.89

5.37b

1.28

3.15c

1.57

18.68

.000

Negative

3.02a

1.97

2.95a

3.36

4.51b

1.65

5.42

.006

Note. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts are significantly different
(p<.05).

p
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SA-mistake conditions (all p <.01). The SA-mistake condition rated themselves as
significantly more self-critical than the control condition (p =.005) but not than the SAstandard condition (p =.09). The control condition rated themselves as significantly less
self-compassionate than the SA-mistake (p=.026) and SA-standard (p =.013) conditions.
The SA-mistake condition rated their experience as significantly less positive than the
control condition (p =.011), who rated it as significantly less positive compared to the SAstandard condition (p =.005). Finally, the SA-mistake condition rated their experience as
significantly more negative than the control and the SA-standard conditions (p =.016 and p
=.013, respectively).
General Distress and State Self-Compassion
There was a significant difference between conditions on the SUDS, F (2, 118)
=5.78, p =.004. The SA-mistake condition was significantly more distressed (see Table 6)
compared to both the SA-standard condition and the control condition (p =.009 and p =
.014, respectively). There was no significant difference between the SA-standard condition
and the control condition (p=.98).
State self-compassion was measured across conditions to determine whether they
differed in how self-compassionate they were in that moment. Participants did not
significantly differ in levels of state self-compassion based on condition, F (2, 118) = .73, p
=.48. The S-SCS was comprised of positive (e.g. “I am trying to keep my emotions in
balance”) and negative (e.g. “I am consumed by feelings of inadequacy”) items. A
MANOVA was run to determine whether conditions differed in levels of state selfcompassion based on valence subscale. The model was significant, F (2,118) = 2.68, p =
.03, η2 = .043. There was a significant difference between condition in how self-
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Table 6
General Distress and State Self-Compassion by Condition
Control
Measure

M

SD

SUDS

24.34a

S-SCS

38.39a

SA-standard
M

SD

25.19

23.13a

27.00

8.76

40.41a

6.41

SA-mistake
M

SD

F
(2,118)

p

41.88b 30.95

5.78

.004

39.90a 7.98

0.73

.483

Note. SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale; S-SCS = State Self-Compassion Scale;
Means in the same row that do not share subscripts are significantly different (p<.05).
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compassionately they responded on the positive subscale (p = .05), not the negative
subscale (p = .15). The difference found on the positive subscale was driven by the SAmistake condition, who showed significantly higher levels of state self-compassion
compared to the control condition (M = 23.46, SD = 5.12 and M = 20.59, SD = 5.92,
respectively), but not compared to the SA-standard condition (M = 21.69, SD = 4.74).
There was no statistically significant difference between conditions in state selfcompassion on the negative subscale. The SA-standard condition did not significantly
differ from the SA-mistake or control condition on either subscale.
Affective States Measure
A MANOVA was run to see whether conditions differed in the affective states. The
MANOVA was significant, F (2,118) = 2.59, p <.001. Overall, the conditions significantly
differed on the following affective states: love, joy, giving, empathic, connected, sympathy,
grateful, proud, content, clear, vulnerable, critical, selfish, scared, and sad (all p < .05; see
Table 7). They did not significantly differ in how humble, confused and angry they felt (all
p > .05).
Certain affective states are of particular relevance to self-affirmation. For example,
feelings of love and connection pertain to the self-transcendence perspective of selfaffirmation (Lindsay & Creswell, 2014). Participants in the SA-standard condition felt
significantly higher feelings of love than did those in the SA-mistake condition (p=.004)
and control condition (p=.025), and they felt more connected compared to the SA-mistake
condition and control conditions (both p <.001). Self-affirmation has also been suggested
as a means to reduce self-criticism (Creswell et al, 2007). Participants in the SA-mistake
condition did feel significantly more critical compared to the SA condition (p =.01) and
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Table 7
Affect Measure Items by Condition
Control
Measure

M

SD

SA-standard

SA-mistake

M

M

SD

SD

F

p

(2,112)

Love

2.78a

1.65

3.92b

1.08

3.10a

1.48

6.43

.002

Joy

2.81a

1.63

3.76b

0.91

2.28a

1.40

12.18

.000

Giving

2.46a

1.50

3.45b

1.06

2.18a

1.18

10.91

.000

Empathic

2.59a

1.50

3.53b

1.11

2.58a

1.20

6.94

.001

Connected

2.78a

1.55

4.05b

0.96

2.78a

1.23

12.90

.000

Sympathy

2.24a

1.26

3.11b

1.27

2.75ab

1.28

4.38

.015

Grateful

2.89a

1.56

4.24b

1.03

3.25a

1.43

9.96

.000

Proud

2.57a

1.39

4.18b

1.06

2.68a

1.46

18.00

.000

Content

2.76a

1.34

3.95b

0.96

2.63a

1.31

13.71

.000

Clear

2.62a

1.21

3.61b

1.05

2.72a

1.34

7.60

.001

Vulnerable

2.05a

1.29

2.55ab

1.41

3.00b

1.41

4.56

.012

Critical

2.24a

1.28

2.24a

1.28

3.13b

1.29

6.22

.003

Humble

2.54a

1.33

3.11b

1.18

2.98ab

1.17

2.19

.117

Selfish

1.35a

0.75

1.74a

1.03

2.30b

1.36

7.45

.001

Scared

1.46a

1.04

2.05ab

1.29

2.35b

1.43

4.87

.009

Sad

1.70a

1.13

2.03a

1.17

2.70b

1.29

6.98

.001

Confused

1.57

.93

1.87

1.10

2.10

1.26

2.23

.112

Angry
1.54a
1.10
1.61a
1.00
2.08b
1.31 2.53
.084
Note: Means in the same row that do not share subscripts are significantly different
(p<.05).
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control condition (p =.008); the SA-standard and control conditions did not differ from one
another in how critical they felt. Self-affirmation (Steele, 1988) appeals to the drive to
maintain “self-integrity” and positive self-regard; therefore, it is possible people who have
self-affirmed may feel more proud. The SA-standard condition rated themselves as
significantly more proud than the SA-mistake condition and control condition (both p
<.001). Finally, self-affirmation has been shown to increase various forms of happiness
(Nelson et al., 2014) and the SA-standard condition did rate themselves as feeling more
“joy” and “content” compared to SA-mistake and control conditions.
Discussion
As hypothesized, the “mistake” self-affirmation (SA-mistake) manipulation led to
higher distress and worse overall affect compared to the standard self-affirmation
manipulation. The SA-mistake condition showed significantly more distress than both the
SA-standard condition and the control condition, who did not differ from one another. It is
not merely writing about a mistake that was distressing, as the control group did not feel
more distressed than the SA-standard group. Writing about a mistake within a domain that
is valuable in one’s life is likely to be much more bothersome than writing about a mistake
in a domain that is unimportant.
Despite these differences, it is interesting that both the self-affirmation conditions
(standard and mistake) rated themselves as more self-compassionate than the control
condition (using the manipulation check items). Neff (2003b) found that self-compassion is
most relevant during times of shame and self-criticism. Although both the control and the
SA-mistake condition discuss a mistake which is likely to invoke such feelings as shame
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and self-criticism, perhaps it is stronger when discussing a mistake in a personally relevant
domain. The control group, who discussed a mistake in an unimportant value, did not feel
that they wrote about their mistake self-compassionately. Further, the SA-standard
manipulation, in which one doesn’t discuss a mistake, but just discusses experiences within
an important value, also felt that they wrote about their experiences more selfcompassionately. This suggests that there could be something about discussing important
values that invokes a sense of self-compassion, at least self-perceived self-compassion.
Although the SA-standard and SA-mistake conditions perceived themselves to have been
more self-compassionate, they did not show higher scores on the state S-SCS. None of the
three conditions significantly differed in their levels of state self-compassion. Neff et al.
(2020) published a state self-compassion scale; however, when conducting the present
study, there was no official state self-compassion scale and so it was modified from the
SCS – short form (Neff, 2003a). It was modified to be general enough for participants to
respond to having written about a memorable experience and a mistake. Initially, it was
surprising that the SA-standard condition, who wrote about a memorable experience, did
not have higher feelings of state self-compassion than the SA-mistake condition and
control condition, who wrote about mistakes. The difficulty lies in the fact that the scale
was developed to be answered within the context of a mistake, as that is when selfcompassion is most relevant. It was likely difficult for the SA-standard condition to
respond to statements such as “when thinking back on my experience, I am trying to see
my flaws as part of the human condition” and “when thoughts about my experience upset
me, I try to keep my emotions in balance” given that these are most likely irrelevant when
thinking about a memorable experience in your top-rated value, rather than a mistake.
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In line with this possibility, when breaking down the S-SCS into positive and negative
subscales, there was a statistically significant difference found on the positive subscale, and
this difference was driven by the SA-mistake condition. The SA-mistake condition had
significantly higher scores of state self-compassion on the positive subscale compared to
the control condition. There were no differences in state self-compassion found between
the SA-standard condition and either the SA-mistake or control condition, suggesting that
they may have found it difficult to respond to items tailored to measure feelings towards a
mistake.
Certain affective states are worth discussing given their relevance to selfaffirmation. For example, the self-transcendence perspective of self-affirmation claims that
self-affirmation works through making one feel more love and connection to others
(Crocker et al., 2008; Lindsay & Creswell, 2014). Participants in the SA-standard condition
felt significantly higher feelings of love and significantly more connected than did those in
the SA-mistake condition and control condition. Both the SA-mistake and control condition
wrote about mistakes; this exercise likely does not foster feelings of love and connection
the way writing about memorable experiences in important values would. This is an
important divergence that the SA-mistake manipulation makes from a standard selfaffirmation manipulation and suggests that it may be fundamentally different. It is
important to note here that although self-compassion manipulations are also conducted in
the context of a mistake and do foster feelings of connection (Akin & Akin, 2015), they are
directly prompted to discuss ways in which others have shared similar experiences
(common humanity), which would foster such feelings.
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Self-affirmation has also been suggested as a means to reduce self-criticism
(Creswell et al, 2007; Bucchianeri & Corning, 2012). In line with the literature, the SAstandard condition reported feeling less critical on the Affect Scale compared to the SAmistake condition. Further, the SA-mistake condition rated themselves as significantly
more critical than the control condition, suggesting that writing about a mistake in an
important value (SA-mistake) would lead to more critical feelings than would writing about
a mistake in an unimportant value (control condition). Similarly, when looking at the
manipulation check item regarding how self-critical participants perceived themselves to be
when writing about their ‘experience’, the SA-mistake condition did indicate that they felt
more self-critical than the control condition, although surprisingly they did not perceive
themselves as more self-critical compared to the SA-standard condition.
The feeling “pride” was of interest, as self-affirmation appeals to the drive to
maintain “self-integrity” and positive self-regard (Steele, 1988). As expected, the SAstandard condition rated themselves as significantly more proud than the SA-mistake
condition and control condition. These findings suggest that writing about the value in the
standard manipulation worked to maintain self-integrity, as expected, whereas writing
about a mistake did not.
Finally, self-affirmation has been shown to increase various forms of ‘happiness’
(i.e. hedonic and eudaimonic; Nelson et al., 2014). Similarly, the SA-standard group rated
themselves as significantly more “joyful” and “content” on the Affect Scale compared to
the SA-mistake and control conditions.
Given that the SA-mistake condition seemed to differ in some theoretically
important ways from the SA-standard condition, the focus of study three was to assess
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whether a standard values-affirmation manipulation would reduce anticipatory anxiety. We
decided to re-run study one using a standard values-affirmation condition to get a more
accurate picture on whether self-affirmation reduces anticipatory anxiety, and whether it
does so by increasing state self-compassion.
Study Three
Study three compared a standard values-affirmation condition to a control condition
on levels of anticipatory anxiety pertaining to an upcoming speech task. We did not include
a self-compassion manipulation in study three because we wanted to test an authentic
values-affirmation, not in the context of a mistake. Given self-compassion is most relevant
in the context of a mistake, we felt that it led to too many discrepancies between
conditions. Instead, we chose to focus on just values-affirmation and to see whether state
self-compassion was a mechanism of change. We hypothesized that a standard valuesaffirmation manipulation would lead to reduced anticipatory anxiety due to increased state
self-compassion. This time, participants were preselected for high versus low social anxiety
in order to explore whether a self-affirmation manipulation is more effective for those with
high social anxiety, compared to those with low social anxiety. It was hypothesized that,
just as self-compassion has been found to be especially effective for those with high social
anxiety (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017), self-affirmation would similarly be more effective
for this group. Therefore, it was expected that there would be an interaction between
anxiety level and condition such that the high social anxiety group would report lower
levels of anticipatory anxiety when in the self-affirmation condition compared to the
control condition, but the low social anxiety group would report similar levels of
anticipatory anxiety regardless of condition. Further, it was hypothesized that state self-
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Figure 3.
Hypothesized Moderated Mediation
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compassion would mediate the effect of self-affirmation on reduced anticipatory
anxiety for those with high social anxiety (see Figure 3).
Method
Participants
There were 209 undergraduate students that participated in the study. Thirty-eight
participants were excluded due to being suspicious about the nature of the study.
Specifically, they were not convinced they had to give the speech (the anxiety induction). It
is suspected that the participants’ friends who had taken the first study may have told them
they wouldn’t have to give the speech, leading to a high exclusion rate for the third study.
This left a total of 171 participants between the ages of 17 and 27 (average age 18.49, 84%
female; 70.2% White, 12.9% Asian, 4.7% Black, 11% other) enrolled in a psychology
course at Wilfrid Laurier University that participated in this study. Participants were
preselected for high social anxiety using standard cut-offs (SPIN = 30 and SIAS = 34;
Harwood & Kocovski, 2017; n = 78) or low social anxiety (SPIN = 10 or SIAS = 19; n =
93). They were randomly assigned to either complete a self-affirmation writing exercise (n
= 82) or a control writing exercise (n = 89). The participants received 1.0 credit towards
their course grade for partaking in this study.
Materials
The baseline measures used were the SPIN, SIAS, one-item depression scale, SCS
and a one-item Self-Esteem scale. These were all the same as what was used in study one,
with the exception of the one-item depression scale (this item replaced the BDI). The same
outcome measures were also used as in study one: SUDS, STAI-S, ASBQ and modified S-
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SCS. An additional measure was used to examine state self-compassion: The Feelings of
State Self-Compassion Scale.
Single Depression Item. A one-item depression scale was used: “I feel depressed”.
Participants responded to this statement on a 7-point scale (1 = not very true of me à 7 =
very true of me).
State Self-Compassion Scale. The same modified state self-compassion scale from
study one was used as the primary measure of state self-compassion.
Feelings of State Self-Compassion. The Feelings of State Self-Compassion Scale
(FSSC; Lindsay & Creswell, 2014) is a seven-item measure borrowed from Lindsay and
Creswell concerning feelings related to self-compassion. Participants are asked to rank how
much they feel 7 affective states towards themselves leading up to their speech (1 = not at
all à 7 = extremely). The states are: critical, sympathetic, grateful, trusting, vulnerable,
joyful, and loving. A total score is calculated by adding each individual item’s score (items
1 and 5 are reverse-scored). This measure was added as a secondary measure of state selfcompassion. Whereas the S-SCS is modified from the SCS (Neff, 2003a) and taps into the
three constructs of self-compassion (self-kindness, common humanity, and mindfulness)
the FSSC taps into other theoretically relevant feelings. The FSSC was created by Lindsay
and Creswell (2014) to determine whether a self-affirmation induction led to an increase in
present-moment feelings that are theoretically associated with self-compassion. Unlike the
modified state self-compassion scale, the FSSC is more vague and does not probe into how
self-compassionate participants were in specific ways while preparing for their speech.

VALUES-AFFIRMATION AND SELF-COMPASSION

59

Manipulation check. The manipulation check consisted of one brief statement that
participants responded to on a 7-point Likert scale: “what I wrote about was very important
to me” (1= not at all importantà 7 = extremely important).
Procedure (see Appendix C)
Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to better understand thought
processes surrounding important values. Baseline measures (depression, self-compassion)
were administered to ensure that there were no baseline differences between conditions.
Participants were randomly assigned to the self-affirmation manipulation or a
control condition, creating a total of four conditions: 1) high social anxiety/self-affirmation
manipulation (n = 36); 2) high social anxiety/control (n = 42); 3) low social anxiety/selfaffirmation manipulation (n = 46); and 4) low social anxiety/control (n = 47).
Self-affirmation manipulation. The self-affirmation manipulation was a standard
values-affirmation used in previous research (Lindsay & Creswell, 2014). Participants were
instructed to rank a set of values from 1 (most important) to 13 (least important). The
values were: artistic skills, sense of humor, relationships with friends/family,
spontaneity/living live in the moment, social skills, athletics, musical ability/appreciation,
physical attractiveness, creativity, academic skills, romance, religion, and other. They were
then asked to complete a writing exercise discussing their top-ranked value. Specifically,
the instructions read: “Consider your top ranked value (the value most important to you –
ranked number 1). Describe why this value is important to you and how it has made you
feel good about yourself.”
Control condition. The control condition was intended to account for any effects
resulting from writing about a value, but without any aspect of self-affirmation. The
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control condition received the same instructions to rank the set of 13 values; however, they
were instructed to write about their bottom ranked value. Specifically, the instructions read:
“Consider your bottom ranked value (the value least important to you – ranked number 13).
Describe why you think this value might be important to somebody else.”
Following the self-affirmation manipulation phase, there was a brief manipulation
check regarding how important the value that they wrote about was to them. All
participants then underwent an anxiety induction, which was implemented through a threeminute impromptu speech task. Participants were told the following: “You will be taking
part in a study that examines how people talk about their personal values in job interviews.
This is an important topic because research has shown that performance in interviews is
correlated with whether applicants are offered the position. In addition, how well people
perform in mock job interview situations is highly predictive of how well they typically
perform in real life and whether they will obtain future jobs. Please discuss how your
personal values make you a desirable employee.” Participants were told they would be
speaking in front of the group (ranging from 1-5 people, depending on how full the
research slot is).
Following the anxiety induction, participants were asked to complete the SUDS,
STAI-S, and ASBQ to assess anticipatory anxiety. They also completed two measures of
state self-compassion – the FSSC, and the S-SCS. Upon completion of these measures,
participants were told that they were not actually required to give the speech.
Data Analysis
A 2 (high social anxiety vs. low social anxiety) x 2 (self-affirmation vs. control)
MANOVA was conducted to determine whether there was any effect of the independent
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variables (social anxiety and self-affirmation manipulation) on the dependent variables
(anticipatory anxiety and state self-compassion). Further, mediation analyses were run to
explore whether self-affirmation increases state self-compassion, which in turn decreases
state anxiety. Three moderated mediation models were tested using Hayes Process to
determine whether self-affirmation decreases anticipatory anxiety by increasing state selfcompassion, and whether this is moderated by social anxiety type (X = Condition; M =
State Self-Compassion; Y = SUDS/STAI-S/ASBQ; W = Social Anxiety Type).
Results
Baseline Measures
Participants’ social anxiety, depression, SC and self-esteem were measured across
conditions. There were no significant baseline differences found on the SIAS, SPIN, SCS,
depression scale or self-esteem scale, (all F < 1; see Table 8).
Manipulation Check
Participants in the self-affirmation condition were asked to pick an important value
to discuss whereas participants in the control were asked to speak about their least
important value. A manipulation check was conducted to determine how important the
value they chose to write about was to them. There was a significant difference between
conditions, F (1, 167) = 428.59, p< .001, η2 = .72, such that those in the self-affirmation
condition rated their value as significantly more important than those in the control
condition (M = 6.65, SD = .84 and M = 2.55, SD = 1.58, respectively).
Effect of Condition on Anticipatory Anxiety and State Self-Compassion by Social
Anxiety Level
A 2 (social anxiety type: high vs. low) x 2 (condition: self-affirmation vs. control)
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Table 8
Baseline Descriptive Statistics by Condition
Control
(n=89)
Measure

Self-Affirmation
(n=81)

M

SD

M

SD

F
(1,167)

p

SPIN

26.81

14.98

24.54

14.75

.997

.32

SIAS

31.26

16.50

29.67

15.21

.426

.52

Self-Compassion
SCS

72.42

16.05

74.37

17.21

.585

.45

Depression
Single-item
Depression

2.66

1.49

2.84

1.58

.576

.45

Self-Esteem
Single-item
Self-Esteem

4.39

1.52

4.09

1.33

1.97

.16

Note. SIAS= Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory. SCS =
Self-Compassion Scale.
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MANOVA was run using the SUDS, STAI-S, ASBQ, FSSC and state SCS as dependent
variables. The MANOVA revealed a main effect of social anxiety type, F (5, 162) = 20.90,
p < .001, η2 = .39. Those with high social anxiety (HSA) responded to the speech task with
higher levels of anticipatory anxiety compared to those with low social anxiety (LSA).
Those with HSA also had lower levels of state self-compassion compared to those with
LSA, as depicted by their lower scores on the S-SCS and FSSC (both p <.001). There was
also a main effect of condition, F (5, 162) = 2.40, p = .04, η2 = .07, such that those in the
self-affirmation condition responded to the speech task with lower levels of anxiety
compared to the control condition (p = .04). The interaction effect was not significant, F (5,
162) = 1.1, p = .36, η2 = .03.
Univariate analyses revealed a significant difference between the LSA group and
the HSA group on the SUDS, F (3, 166) = 63.83, p < .001, η2 = .28, STAI-S, F (3, 166) =
79.93, p < .001, η2 = .33, ASBQ, F (3, 166) = 65.11, p < .001, η2 = .28, FSSC, F (3, 166) =
31.95 p < .001, η2 = .16, and S-SCS, F (3, 166) = 74.47, p < .001, η2 = .31. Those with high
social anxiety scored higher than those with low social anxiety on the SUDS, STAI-S, and
the ASBQ (see Table 9). Those with high social anxiety scored lower than those with low
social anxiety on the FSSC and the S-SCS.
The main effect of condition was driven by the differences between the selfaffirmation and the control condition on the ASBQ, F (1, 166) = 5.27, p < .02. Those in the
control condition showed higher levels of anticipatory processing than those in the selfaffirmation condition. Conditions did not differ significantly on the remaining measures
(SUDS, STAI-S, FSSC, and S-SCS; p = .24, p = .24, p = .34, and p = .17, respectively);
however, the pattern of results was similar to the ASBQ on most other measures.
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Table 9.
Anticipatory Anxiety and Self-Compassion Measures by Condition and Anxiety Group
Control

Self-Affirmation
HSA
LSA
HSA
LSA
(n=42)
(n=47)
(n=35)
(n=46)
Items
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
SUDS
69.95 19.71 44.50 25.71
67.91 16.64 38.50 24.21
STAI-S
61.17 10.70 47.55 14.68
62.34 9.52 41.82 13.06
ASBQ
34.81 5.99 27.06 6.83
33.31 7.06 23.59 7.96
FSSC
19.24 6.05 24.64 8.06
17.29 6.28 24.47 7.88
S-SCS
30.14 7.08 39.00 8.10
29.86 7.80 42.78 9.36
Note. HSA = high social anxiety. LSA = low social anxiety. SUDS = Subjective Units of
Distress. STAI-S = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State Version. ASBQ = Anticipatory
Social Behaviours Questionnaire. FSSC = Feeling of State Self-Compassion. S-SCS =
State Self-Compassion Scale.
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The interaction effect between social anxiety and condition was not significant at
the multivariate level; however, there were two measures that were approaching
significance at the univariate level. The STAI-S was approaching significance, F (1, 166) =
3.27, p = .07, η2 = .02, and showed an interesting pattern of results. For those with low
social anxiety (LSA), the self-affirmation condition showed lower levels of state anxiety
compared to the control condition; for those with high social anxiety (HSA), their anxiety
levels did not differ between self-affirmation and control condition. The S-SCS depicted a
similar pattern, F (1, 166) = 2.60, p = .11, η2 = .02. For the LSA group, there were higher
rates of state self-compassion in the self-affirmation condition than the control condition;
for the HSA group, there was no difference in levels of state self-compassion between the
self-affirmation and control condition.
Self-Compassion as a Mediator
The hypothesized self-compassion mediation model was tested in two interlinked
steps. First, a simple mediation model was run to see whether the self-affirmation condition
increased state self-compassion, which in turn decreased state anxiety. Next, social anxiety
was integrated into the model to see whether participants’ level of social anxiety had a
significant moderating effect on the model. It was hypothesized that self-affirmation would
reduce anticipatory anxiety through increasing state self-compassion and that this effect
would only be significant for those with high social anxiety, not low social anxiety.
Six simple mediation models were tested using condition as the independent variable, one
of two measures of state self-compassion (FSSC, S-SCS) as the mediator, and one of three
measures of anticipatory anxiety as the dependent variable (SUDS, STAI-S, ASBQ). The
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models were not significant with either S-SCS as the mediator (p = .12, p = .14, p = .14) or
FSSC (p = .55, p = .47, p = .47) as the mediator.
To examine the hypothesized effect of social anxiety as a moderator, three
moderated mediation models (Haye’s Process, model 8) were run using social anxiety type
as the moderator. The moderated mediation models (see Figures 4, 5, 6) showed that those
in the self-affirmation condition had significantly higher levels of state self-compassion (SSCS), which in turn decreased anticipatory anxiety, and this was moderated by
participants’ level of social anxiety, such that this effect was only present for those with
LSA, not for those with HSA. Interestingly, the direct path from condition to anticipatory
anxiety was not significant, so it seems that state self-compassion accounted for the effect
that condition had on reducing anxiety. Moreover, social anxiety moderated this effect,
depicted by the fact that the moderated mediation model was significant while the simple
mediation model was not.
Writing Valence, Writing Quantity, and Chosen Value
To help understand why the self-affirmation manipulation was effective for the
LSA group but not the HSA group, we coded the data for several things. Firstly, we looked
at how positively/negatively participants wrote in their writing exercise in case people with
HSA were more negative and perhaps the self-affirmation was not able to over-ride the
negativity (see Table 10). Two separate coders counted how many times participants wrote
a positive or negative phrase (i.e. “I have always been good at music” or “I have never been
very good at music so…”). A two-way random effect intra-class correlation (ICC)
coefficient was used to determine the reliability of the coding method for how many
positive and negative phrases participants wrote. Interrater reliability was moderate for
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Figure 4.
Social Anxiety Level Moderates the Mediation Effect of State Self-Compassion (SUDS)
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Figure 5.
Social Anxiety Level Moderates the Mediation Effect of State Self-Compassion (STAI-S)
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Figure 6.
Social Anxiety Level Moderates the Mediation Effect of State Self-Compassion (ASBQ)
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Table 10
Valence and Writing Engagement across Conditions and Social Anxiety Level
Control
HSA
(n=42)
M
SD

LSA
(n=47)
M
SD

Self-Affirmation
HSA
LSA
(n=35)
(n=46)
M
SD
M
SD

Items
Valence
Positive
.81
1.04
.81
.77
1.69
Negative
.55
.74
.55
.51
.06
Writing Amount
Speech
.90
.37
.98
.44
.74
Manipulation
.95
.99
.68
.99
1.43
Note. HSA = high social anxiety. LSA = low social anxiety.

.93
.24

1.65
.04

.74
.21

.44
.85

1.13
1.43

.45
.89
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both positive and negative phrases, ICC = .66 and ICC = .62, respectively. The main effect
of social anxiety type was not significant, showing that participants with HSA were not
writing more negatively/less positively than the LSA group (p = .93). There was a main
effect of condition (p = .000), such that those in the self-affirmation condition wrote more
positively and less negatively than the control group, F (3, 167) = 35.27, p = .000.
Next, we examined how much the participants wrote in two sections of the study: 1)
the writing exercise (self-affirmation vs. control) and 2) the speech preparation
page. It is possible that the self-affirmation condition was not effective for those with high
social anxiety because they did not engage with the self-affirmation writing exercise to the
same degree. The coders ranked their writing from 0-2 depending on how much they wrote
(0 = very little, jot notes, without depth; 1 = several sentences, some depth; 2 = extensively
wrote; with depth). Interrater reliability was good, ICC = .73. A 2 (self-affirmation vs.
control) x 2 (high social anxiety vs. low social anxiety) MANOVA was run, with the
amount they wrote as part of the manipulation and the amount they wrote for speech
preparation as the two dependent variables.
The main effects of social anxiety type and condition were both significant (p =
.002, p = .000), as was the interaction effect (p = .036). Looking at univariate analyses, the
significant main effect of social anxiety type was based on how much they wrote in their
speech task (p = .001), not how much they wrote regarding the manipulation (p = .354).
The LSA group wrote more in their speech preparation than the HSA group; the LSA and
HSA groups did not differ in how much they wrote in the manipulation writing task. The
significant main effect of condition was based on how much they wrote in their writing
exercise (p = .000), not how much they wrote in their speech preparation (p = .939).
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Participants in the self-affirmation group wrote more in their manipulation writing exercise
than those in the control group; the conditions did not differ in how much they wrote in
their speech preparation. The interaction effect was based on how much they wrote in their
speech (p = .019), but not how much they wrote as part of the manipulation writing task (p
=.332). For the LSA group, participants in the self-affirmation condition wrote more in
their speech preparation compared to the control condition; for the HSA group, participants
in the self-affirmation condition wrote less during their speech preparation compared to the
control condition.
Lastly, we looked at the value that participants ranked as their most important
value. The most commonly top-ranked value was by far ‘relationships with family and
friends’, with 61.9% of people ranking it as their #1 value. The second most common topranked value was ‘social skills’, with 9.7% of people ranking it as their #1 value. This
means that a total of 71.6% of people’s top ranked value was a social value. Participants
disproportionately selected ‘relationships with family and friends’ or ‘social skills’
regardless of their social anxiety type: for HSA, 63.6% selected ‘relationships with family
and friends’ and 8.0% selected ‘social skills’; for LSA, 60.6% selected ‘relationships with
family and friends’ and 11.0% selected ‘social skills’.
Discussion
Study three implemented a standard values-affirmation manipulation, not in the
context of a mistake. In line with hypotheses there was a main effect of both social anxiety
type and condition. Those with high social anxiety showed higher anticipatory anxiety and
lower state self-compassion than those with low social anxiety. The self-affirmation
condition had lower anticipatory anxiety (specifically, anticipatory processing) than the
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control condition. The self-affirmation condition did not differ from the control condition
in levels of state self-compassion.
Although the interaction effect was not significant, results on two measures were
approaching significance: the STAI-S (state anxiety) and S-SCS (state self-compassion),
though in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized. For those with low social
anxiety, they had higher state anxiety and lower state self-compassion in the control group
compared to the self-affirmation condition. For those with high social anxiety, there was no
difference. The results on the SUDS (general distress) and the ASBQ (anticipatory
processing) displayed the same pattern – for the low social anxiety group, they had higher
distress and anticipatory processing in control compared to self-affirmation; for the high
social anxiety group, their distress and anticipatory processing scores were almost the same
across conditions. It seems that self-affirmation is actually more effective for those with
low social anxiety and does not affect those with high social anxiety.
The mediation analyses provided further support for this notion. Although the
simple mediation models (X = condition; M = S-SCS; Y = SUDS/STAI-S/ASBQ) were not
significant, the moderated mediation (W = social anxiety type) models were. The
moderated mediation models depicted that for only the low social anxiety group, selfaffirmation reduced anticipatory anxiety, and this effect was mediated by state selfcompassion.
These results are contrary to our hypotheses. We hypothesized an interaction effect
in which the self-affirmation would be more effective for people with high social anxiety
than people with low social anxiety, as we were hypothesizing a self-compassion account
of self-affirmation (Lindsay & Creswell, 2014), and self-compassion has been shown to be
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more effective for those with high social anxiety (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017). Instead, it
appears that self-affirmation was only effective in reducing anticipatory anxiety for those
with low social anxiety, and it had no effect for those with high social anxiety. So why was
the self-affirmation manipulation ineffective for the HSA group?
The self-affirmation manipulation does appear to have worked, as people with low
social anxiety showed lower anticipatory anxiety towards the upcoming speech task in the
self-affirmation condition compared to the control condition. Therefore, there must be an
explanation as to why the self-affirmation was not helpful for those with high social
anxiety. To further investigate these results, two research assistants coded the participants’
manipulation writing exercises and speech preparation. Firstly, they coded for how
positively/negatively participants wrote in their writing exercise. We speculated that people
with high social anxiety may have written more negatively throughout their writing
exercise, dulling any effect of self-affirmation; however, we did not find support for this.
The HSA group did not write more negatively or less positively than the LSA group. One
limitation worth noting is that the interrater reliability was only ‘moderate’ for the
positive/negative phrase count in participants’ writing exercise.
Next, we looked at how much participants wrote for their writing exercise and
speech preparation task, and inter-rater reliability was good for this coding. How much
people wrote in their manipulation writing exercise was of particular interest, to explore
whether the HSA group was not engaging with the self-affirmation task to the extent the
LSA group was. Once again, we did not find support for this. There was a main effect of
social anxiety level, such that the LSA group wrote more in their speech preparation task
compared to the HSA group; however, the LSA group did not write more in the
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manipulation writing exercise compared to the HSA group. There was a main effect of
condition, such that the self-affirmation condition wrote more in their manipulation writing
exercise than the control condition; the conditions did not differ in how much they wrote in
their speech preparation. The interaction effect showed that for the LSA group, the selfaffirmation condition wrote more in their speech preparation compared to the control
condition. Interestingly, we found the opposite to be true for the HSA group – they actually
wrote less in their speech preparation in the self-affirmation condition compared to the
control condition. It appears as though the self-affirmation manipulation was specifically
unhelpful for those with high social anxiety.
The unhelpful nature of the self-affirmation task among those with high social
anxiety may be due to the values that participants selected to write about. Past research has
shown that participants often rank a social aspect as their top-rated value (Crocker et al.,
2008). Similarly, the value most participants chose to write about in the current research
was relationships with friends and family (61.9%), an area in which people with high social
anxiety are likely to feel incompetent. People with social anxiety disorder experience fewer
positive emotions during everyday social interactions (Kashdan et al., 2013) and more
anxiety and negative predictions about social events even during positive social encounters
(Alden et al., 2008). People with high social anxiety also feel less competent in their social
life (Alden & Wallace, 1995; Clark, 2001). The purpose of self-affirmation is to boost
feelings of self-adequacy to protect against psychological threat; however, discussing a
social value is not likely to boost feelings of self-adequacy for people with high social
anxiety, despite it being an important value to them. A discussion of directions for future
research to address this issue follows in the general discussion.
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General Discussion
Mindfulness-based and values-based strategies have been offered as a way to
improve the success rate of treatment for anxiety disorders (Hayes et al., 2012). The
current research explored two related concepts: self-compassion and self-affirmation
(specifically, a values-affirmation). A values-affirmation was of particular interest to us
given the prominence of values in current therapies for social anxiety disorder (i.e.
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy).
Self-compassion was previously found to be especially effective in reducing
anticipatory anxiety for those with high social anxiety (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017). The
current research aimed to build on this previous study and the Lindsay and Creswell (2014)
study, by exploring whether a self-affirmation manipulation would also be effective in
reducing anticipatory anxiety, and whether this effect would be mediated by state selfcompassion and therefore be more effective for those with high social anxiety. Study one
compared three conditions (self-compassion, self-affirmation, and control) in levels of
anticipatory anxiety towards an upcoming speech task. Study two compared the modified
self-affirmation manipulation used in study one to a standard self-affirmation manipulation.
The third and final study compared a standard self-affirmation manipulation to a control
condition on anticipatory anxiety as in study one; however, this time participants were
preselected for high versus low social anxiety so that any differences between these groups
could be examined.
In study one, a self-affirmation, self-compassion and control group were compared
in their anticipatory anxiety related to an upcoming speech task. The self-affirmation and
self-compassion manipulations were each modified slightly to be as consistent with one
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another as possible. More specifically, the self-affirmation manipulation asked participants
to recall a mistake (as self-compassion manipulations commonly draw on a mistake), and
the self-compassion manipulation was in the context of their top-rated value (just as a
standard self-affirmation manipulation is). It was hypothesized that both the selfcompassion and self-affirmation condition would have lower anticipatory anxiety
compared to the control condition, and that this would be due to an increase in state selfcompassion.
We did not find support for our hypotheses in study one. The control condition had
higher baseline levels of social anxiety and lower baseline levels of self-compassion
compared to the self-compassion condition. After controlling for these baseline differences,
there were no significant differences in anticipatory anxiety between the self-compassion,
self-affirmation and control condition. Moreover, the mediation analysis was not
significant after controlling for baseline differences, showing that there was no mediated
effect of condition on state self-compassion and subsequently on lower anticipatory
anxiety. We speculate that this may come down to the method used to implement selfaffirmation. Participants were asked to recall a mistake (as opposed to the traditional
‘experience’) that they had made within the domain of their top-rated value, prior to
discussing in full why this value is important to them. To discuss a mistake is likely to be
distressing, not affirming, and may take away the legitimacy of a self-affirmation
manipulation. This was addressed in study two.
The modified manipulation may have been the cause behind the other unexpected
finding: that those with low social anxiety, rather than high social anxiety, actually
appeared to benefit more from the self-compassion induction. A moderation analysis was
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run to determine whether people respond differently to the self-compassion or selfaffirmation conditions based on their baseline levels of social anxiety. Contrary to
hypotheses, this model showed that for those with low social anxiety (and not for those
with moderate or high social anxiety), a self-compassion induction reduced general distress
compared to a control group. Once again, there was no difference between self-affirmation
and control condition at any level of social anxiety. The fact that the self-compassion
condition led to lower anticipatory anxiety compared to control for those with low social
anxiety was surprising, given that previous research found self-compassion to reduce
anticipatory anxiety more among those with high social anxiety, and not low (Harwood &
Kocovski, 2017). The difference may be in the manipulation used. In the current research,
participants were asked to discuss a mistake within their most important value, whereas
typical self-compassion inductions have participants discuss a mistake more generally, not
relating to their most important value. It is possible that discussing a mistake in the context
of one’s most important value is much more distressing than a mistake made in everyday
life. The self-compassion manipulation in the context of a mistake was still effective for
those with low social anxiety; however, people with high social anxiety have been shown
to respond to stressful social situations with symptoms characteristic of those with PTSD
(Erwin et al., 2006), including re-experiencing, avoidance, and hyper-arousal. Perhaps
discussing a mistake in the context of their most important value was especially triggering
for those with high social anxiety.
Study two compared levels of general distress and affect across three conditions: a
standard self-affirmation (SA-standard), a self-affirmation in the context of a mistake (SAmistake), and a control group. It was hypothesized that the modified self-affirmation
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manipulation (SA-mistake) would lead to higher distress and overall worse affect compared
to the standard self-affirmation manipulation, and therefore would not be a fair
representation of self-affirmation. Self-affirmation aims to boost self-integrity (Steele,
1988), and a typical values-affirmation exercise is not framed within the context of a
mistake. The goal in modifying the values-affirmation in study one was to keep it as
consistent as possible with the self-compassion condition (which is often done in the
context of shame or self-criticism, such as a mistake; e.g., Harwood & Kocovski, 2017);
however, in retrospect, it seems obvious that writing about an experience that invokes
shame will do just the opposite of boosting self-integrity. It is quite possible that selfaffirmation would have reduced anticipatory anxiety, as hypothesized, had we used a fair
representation of self-affirmation.
Study two confirmed that the SA-mistake and SA-standard manipulations were
dissimilar. When done in the context of a mistake, the self-affirmation writing exercise led
to higher levels of distress and lower positive affect/higher negative affect. While it is
argued that mood or affect are not the mechanism behind self-affirmation’s effects
(McQueen & Klein, 2006), several of the specific items are still theoretically relevant. The
affective states that were looked at in more detail due to their link to self-affirmation are:
“pride”, “critical”, “love”, “connected” and “joyful”/“content”.
In general, self-affirmation refers to cognitive events that support a global sense of
self-integrity (Steele, 1988). According to self-affirmation theory, discussing important
values boost self-integrity and overall self-regard, which reduces defensiveness. When selfaffirmed, participants have also been shown to have positive self-feelings (Lindsay &
Creswell, 2014). In the current study, participants in the SA-standard condition felt more
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“proud” compared to the SA-mistake condition and control condition. This is further
relevant if self-compassion is a mechanism of effect underlying self-affirmation, as selfcompassion also predicts positive affective states, and positively correlates to self-worth
(Neff & Vonk, 2009). Self-affirmation also leads to decreased levels of self-criticism
(Lindsay & Creswell, 2014). The SA-mistake condition showed significantly higher levels
of self-criticism compared to the SA-standard condition and the control condition. The
third and fourth affective state worth mentioning are “love” and “connected”. Recall the
two main theoretical perspectives on self-affirmation: transcending-self perspective and
self-resources perspective. The transcending-self perspective states that self-affirmation
enables one to transcend one’s own image concerns by increasing outward-focused
feelings (Crocker et al., 2008). In line with the transcending-self perspective of selfaffirmation, studies have found self-affirmation to lead participants to show increased
feelings of love and connectedness (Crocker et al., 2008; Lindsay & Creswell, 2014). Study
two replicated this finding, with the SA-standard manipulation having higher self-perceived
feelings of ‘love’ and ‘connected’ than the SA-mistake condition and the control condition.
Finally, self-affirmation has been shown to improve both hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing (“happiness”; Nelson et al., 2014). In line with this, the SA-standard group rated
themselves as feeling significantly more “joyful” and “content” than the SA-mistake and
control conditions. The results from study two led to the decision to re-run the first study
using a true values-affirmation condition.
Study three compared a standard self-affirmation condition and a control condition
on levels of anticipatory anxiety and state self-compassion. Participants were preselected
for either high or low social anxiety so that these group’s response to the self-affirmation
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condition could be compared. It was hypothesized that the self-affirmation condition would
lead to lower anticipatory anxiety and that this effect would be mediated by increased state
self-compassion. It was further hypothesized that this effect would only be significant for
those with high social anxiety.
The results showed that those in the self-affirmation condition did have lower
anticipatory anxiety compared to the control condition. The simple mediation model (with
state self-compassion as the mediator) was not significant. However, the moderated
mediation model (with social anxiety entered as a moderator) was significant; though, not
in the direction we hypothesized.
Contrary to the hypothesis, the third study found that the self-affirmation
manipulation was actually only effective for people with low social anxiety. This was
similar to study one’s results, which showed that the self-compassion manipulation was
only effective in reducing anticipatory anxiety for those with low social anxiety. Study
three results showed no significant difference in anticipatory anxiety between conditions
for those with high social anxiety. There are two plausible explanations for this finding.
First of all, high social anxiety has been found to inhibit a promotion system in which
people “pursue rewards and strive toward the fulfillment of hopes and aspirations” (Scholer
et al. 2012), helping provide a sense of “life purpose”. Values are related to having a sense
of purpose and as such, discussing values would not likely be beneficial for those not living
up to these values and fulfilling their life purpose. Secondly, this study found that people
typically wrote about social belonging or other social aspects: 61.9% said family and
friends is their most important value; the next highest ranked value was social skills at
9.7%. People with high social anxiety struggle to form and maintain fulfilling relationships
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(e.g., Ledley et al., 2008), in part due to anxiety and avoidance behaviors that are engaged
to evade predicted negative social experiences (Clark, 2001; Hofmann, 2007). People with
high social anxiety are overall unlikely to feel competent within the domain of social
relationships (e.g., Herbert & Dalrymple, 2005; Dalrymple & Herbert, 2007), and
therefore, the self-affirmation is not likely to work in the same way it does for others – to
boost their feelings of self-adequacy. Perhaps had we specified that they only write about
something that is highly important to them and in which they feel competent we would
have seen results reflective of self-affirmation. Instead, we asked them their most important
value (to which most ranked relationships with family friends as #1) and then had them
write about that specific value. Writing about a social value could instigate negative
feelings for those with high social anxiety, as they are likely to hold numerous references
of times when they did not live up to this value; for example, by avoiding a party due to
predicted negative judgments. These cognitions would likely compete with, if not override
altogether, the positive impact that self-affirmation manipulations typically have in the face
of threat.
Further, therapy focuses on relating the important value to the threat at hand (e.g.,
Kocovski et al, 2013; Kocovski et al, 2019; Arch et al., 2019). For example, somebody
with social anxiety would bring their value of friendship to the forefront of their mind when
attending a party that they would like to avoid. Focusing on why it is important, as opposed
to their internal physical experiences, is a helpful tactic in motivating somebody to pursue
valued living, even in the face of anxiety. Perhaps the current study should have had
participants link their important value to the threatening situation at hand to better reflect
the way values are used in therapy.

VALUES-AFFIRMATION AND SELF-COMPASSION

83

The mechanism of change in self-affirmation exercises is not well specified. There
are two main theoretical perspectives regarding how self-affirmation works – the selfresources perspective states that self-affirmation boosts one’s self-image for coping with
threats (Sherman & Cohen, 2006), whereas the transcending-self perspective states that
self-affirmation facilitates ones transcending self-image concerns by increasing otherdirected feelings (Crocker et al., 2008). Lindsay and Creswell (2014) proposed a selfcompassion account of self-affirmation, connecting the two perspectives. They theorized
that: in regard to the self-resources perspective, the self-image boost is about feeling more
compassion towards oneself (as opposed to a self-esteem boost); and in regard to the
transcending-self perspective, the compassionate feelings generated by self-affirmation are
self-focused (as opposed to other-focused). Their research supports this perspective,
showing that self-affirmation led to increased prosocial behaviour, and it did so through
increasing compassionate feelings towards oneself, which in turn promoted prosocial
behaviour. A noteworthy contribution from the current research is that, just as Lindsay and
Creswell (2014) found, there does appear to be a mediating role of state self-compassion on
self-affirmation. For those with low social anxiety, the values-affirmation exercise led to
reduced anticipatory anxiety and this was mediated by increased state self-compassion. The
direct path of condition to anticipatory anxiety was not significant, while the indirect path
(through state self-compassion) was significant.
This research adds to the literature which has recognized that individuals differ in
their vulnerability to the threat and these differences can serve as a significant moderator of
self-affirmation effects (Harris & Napper, 2005; Harris et al., 2007; Sherman et al., 2009).
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Jessop et al. (2017) found that self-affirmation can actually exacerbate negative responses
to stress under certain conditions. Their study focused on important life events that are
characterized by low levels of control. They provided preliminary evidence that selfaffirmation may actually have detrimental effects on those who are most vulnerable.
Specifically, they investigated an imagined stressful childbirth scenario; those with high
fear of childbirth and low confidence actually had more negative affect following a selfaffirmation manipulation whereas those with low fear of childbirth and high confidence
had more positive affect following a self-affirmation manipulation. Jessop et al. reasoned
that self-affirmation may yield more negative results when defensive responses are actually
advantageous (Sherman & Hartson, 2011), as self-affirmation lowers defensive responding.
While we did not find self-affirmation to have a detrimental effect on those who are most
vulnerable (the high social anxiety group), we did find that it was not helpful for them.
Further, coding analyses hinted at a possible detrimental effect of self-affirmation on those
with high social anxiety, as this group actually wrote less in their speech preparation
following a self-affirmation manipulation compared to the control group. In contrast, the
low social anxiety group, who benefitted from self-affirmation, wrote more in their speech
preparation in the self-affirmation condition compared to the control group.
Finally, it is possible that the values articulation exercise may not have been long
enough, or substantial enough, to yield results in a highly anxious sample. Although brief
writing tasks have been shown to be effective for those with high social anxiety in some
cases (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017), other research has found that more substantial values
exercises consisting of revisiting the task, or even daily reminders to consider one’s
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personal values throughout their daily activities over a more extended period of time, may
be necessary to alter anxiety levels in an anxious population (Tull et al., 2018).
Limitations, Future Directions, and Implications
This study suggests that a brief values exercise is not effective for people with high
social anxiety; however, we did not work with a clinical sample and therefore this research
cannot be generalized to this population. It is also reasonable to suggest values work be
more relevant to the task or threat at hand (consistent with how values are used in therapy)
in order for it to be successful in reducing anxiety for a highly anxious sample. Values are a
useful tactic in therapy to motivate people towards values consistent living in the face of
negative internal experiences, such as anxiety. Discussing values in general, without
aiming to redirect focus on the values, as opposed to negative internal experiences (e.g.,
anxiety), may not be beneficial.
Further, we did not measure how competent participants felt within their valued
domain. This may have been a crucial factor in whether the values-affirmation was actually
affirming, as it should be. For those with high social anxiety, discussing a social facet of
life (i.e. relationships with friends and family or social skills) may have not been selfaffirming if they feel incompetent in their social life. Future research with a highly socially
anxious population should specify that the value chosen be one that is not only important to
them but also in a domain in which they feel competent.
The current research implemented the values-affirmation prior to the ‘threat’
(speech task). Self-affirmation research within social psychology often puts the threat first,
then allows one to buffer against it with a self-affirmation manipulation. In therapy, values
articulations are implemented prior to any threats; therefore, we chose to put it prior to the
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threat within this research as well, given our interest in the applicability of this research to
the clinical side of psychology. The self-affirmation manipulation was still effective in
reducing anticipatory anxiety for those with low social anxiety, showing that it still worked
regardless of its placement.
There was no existing, validated measure of state self-compassion at the time of
designing these studies. We modified Neff’s (2003a) short form scale, and therefore it is
possible the S-SCS did not measure what it intended to. As a secondary measure, we also
borrowed the Feelings of State Self-Compassion Scale (FSSC) used by Lindsay and
Creswell (2014), which include theoretically relevant items with self-compassion. Future
research should use Neff’s State Self-Compassion Scale – Long form (SSCS-L; Neff et al.,
2020) to further support the link between self-affirmation and state self-compassion.
As of now, there is not a clear mechanism of effect underlying self-affirmation.
Further, most research on self-affirmation has been done within social psychological
phenomena, such as bias. As noted by Czech et al. (2011), future research would do well to
further investigate mediators and moderators of self-affirmation on psychological stress.
This would help to create a well-rounded picture of self-affirmation and contribute to
further knowledge of how it exerts its effects. The current research provides evidence for a
self-compassion account of self-affirmation, originally put forth by Lindsay and Creswell
(2014). It seems as though, for some people, self-affirmation can have beneficial effects
(e.g. increased prosocial behaviour; reduced anticipatory anxiety) that are explained by an
increase in state self-compassion. This was shown in the research done by Lindsay and
Creswell and is further evidenced in the current research.
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Given that a self-compassion induction has been shown to be especially effective in
reducing anticipatory anxiety for those with high social anxiety (Harwood & Kocovski,
2017), and self-compassion may be one of the mechanisms of change underlying selfaffirmation, it is still possible that people with high social anxiety will be receptive to a
self-affirmation induction, under the right conditions. Further research is needed to clarify
this. The values-affirmation exercise should be modified for this population to ensure they
are not only speaking about something highly important to them, but also about a domain
in which they feel competent. While many people undeniably value their relationships with
family and friends, people with high social anxiety may still feel that they don’t thrive in
social areas such as this, despite how much they value their social relationships. Instead,
people with high social anxiety should be directed to write about something that is not only
very important to them, but that they also feel competent in.
To confirm whether values-affirmations are in fact only effective in reducing
anxiety for those with low social anxiety, future values-affirmation manipulations should
be less focused on matching the existing social psychology literature and more focused on
being relevant to clinical psychology and therapy. Specifically, future research should
examine a values articulation that a) is relevant to the threat at hand, as this is how values
are often contextualized in therapy; and b) stipulates the value chosen be one that they feel
competent in, rather than in an area in which they may feel especially inadequate.
Despite finding results contrary to hypotheses, the current research tells an
intriguing story and is suggestive of several noteworthy contributions. Firstly, modifying
self-compassion inductions may alter their effect, and this may be especially true among
specific, vulnerable populations. Secondly, a values-affirmation implemented among
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certain populations may benefit from specifying that participants focus on a value that is
not only important to them, but one in which they also feel competent. This is especially
true for populations who may feel incompetent socially (such as those with high social
anxiety), as it appears that people often choose a social domain as their top-rated value.
Thirdly, this research contributes to the literature showing that self-affirmation
manipulations may yield different results (or be ineffective altogether) for certain
vulnerable populations (Harris & Napper, 2005; Harris et al., 2007; Sherman et al., 2009).
Finally, the current research provides further support for the self-compassion account of
self-affirmation (Lindsay & Creswell, 2014), as state self-compassion was found to mediate
the effect of self-affirmation on reduced anticipatory anxiety.
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Appendix A – Study 1
Self-Compassion Manipulation
Consider your top ranked value (the value most important to you). Think about a time
when you made a mistake pertaining to this important value.
Self-Compassion:
• Write a paragraph expressing kindness to yourself in the same way you might
express kindness for someone close to you
•

List some of the ways in which other people have experienced similar events to the
one you described.

•

List the emotions you felt during this event and explain (as objectively as possible)
why you felt that emotion.
Self-affirmation Manipulation

Consider your top ranked value (the value most important to you – ranked number 1).
Think about a time when you made a mistake pertaining to this important value.
•

Briefly state 3 or 4 times in which you made a mistake related to this important
value.

•

Describe the mistake that was most exceptional, influential to you, or important to
you.

•

Explain in full why this value is important.

•

Identify your top two reasons why it’s important to you.

•

Identify how you have acted consistently with this value in the past.
Control

Consider your bottom ranked value (the value least important to you – ranked number 12).
Think about a time when you made a mistake pertaining to this important value.
•

Write a paragraph describing your role in this event.

•

Who else was involved in this event?

•

Describe your feelings about this event.

•

Explain in full why this value is important to others.

•

Identify your top two reasons why you think this value is important to others.
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Manipulation Check
Rate how much you agree with the following statement from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).
1) The value I wrote about is very important to me.
Not at all
important
1
2
3
4

5

6

Extremely
important
7

Modified State Self-Compassion Scale (S-SCS)
Think about how you feel in this moment while preparing for your speech.
“While preparing for my speech…”
Characteristic
1. …I am consumed by feelings of
inadequacy
2. …I am understanding and patient
towards those aspects of myself I
don’t like
3. …I am trying to take a balanced view
of this situation
4. … I feel like most other people are
less flawed than me
5. …I am trying to see my flaws as part
of the human condition
6. … I am giving myself the caring I
need
7. … I am trying to keep my emotions
in balance
8. … I think about my inadequacies and
feel alone in my failures
9. …I tend to obsess and fixate on
everything that is wrong with my
speech
10. … I am reminding myself that
feelings of inadequacy are shared by
most people
11. …I am disapproving and judgmental
of my speech
12. …I am intolerant and impatient
towards aspects of my speech I don’t
like

Almost
Never

Not
Often

Sometimes

Fairly
Often

Almost
Always

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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Appendix B – Study 2
Self-affirmation Manipulation – Phase 1
This part of the study focuses on events experienced within particularly important domains
and the effect that these events have…
Consider the following values and rank them from least (12) to most (1) important:
____ athletic ability
____ being good at art
____ belonging to a social group
____ career
____ creativity
____ government or politics
____ independence
____ learning and gaining knowledge
____ music
____ relationships with family and friends
____ sense of humor
____ spiritual or religious values
Self-Affirmation Manipulation – Phase 2
Self-Affirmation Standard Condition:
Consider your top ranked value (the value most important to you – ranked number 1).
Think about a time when this important value was relevant in your life.
•

Briefly state 3 or 4 memorable experiences that pertain to this important value.

•

Describe the experience that was most exceptional, influential to you, or important
to you.

•

Explain in full why this value is important. Identify your top two reasons why it’s
important.

Self-Affirmation Mistake Condition:
Consider your top ranked value (the value most important to you – ranked number 1).
Think about a time when you made a horrible mistake pertaining to this important value.
•

Briefly state 3 or 4 times in which you made a mistake related to this important
value.
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Describe the mistake that was most exceptional, influential to you, or important to
you.

•

Explain in full why this value is important. Identify your top two reasons why it’s
important.

Control Condition:
Consider your lowest ranked value (the value least important to you – ranked number 12).
Think about a time when you made a horrible mistake pertaining to this value.
•

Briefly state 3 or 4 times in which you made a mistake related to this value.

•

Describe the mistake that was most exceptional, influential to you, or important to
you.

•

Explain in full why this value is important to others. Identify your top two reasons
why it’s important to others
Manipulation Check

1) Looking back, how important to you is the value you chose to write about?
Not at all
self-critical
1
2
3
4
5
6

Extremely
self-critical
7

2) In general, I try to live up to these values
Not at all
self-critical
1
2
3
4

6

Extremely
self-critical
7

3) How self-critical were you when writing about your personal event?
Not at all
self-critical
1
2
3
4
5
6

Extremely
self-critical
7

5

4) To what extent did you write about your personal event compassionately?
Not at all
Extremely
compassionately
compassionately
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
5) How positive was the event you wrote about?
Not at all
positive

Extremely
positive
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2

3

4

6) How negative was the event you wrote about?
Not at all
negative
1
2
3
4

5

5

6

7

6

Extremely
negative
7

State Self-Compassion Scale (S-SCS) – study two
Think about how you felt in this moment while discussing your experience related to
an important value
“When thinking back on my experience I wrote about…”
Almost
Not
Characteristic
Never
Often
1. …I am consumed by feelings
of inadequacy

Some
times

Fairly
Often

Almost
Always

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

3. …I am trying to take a
balanced view of this
situation

1

2

3

4

5

4.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

2.

…I am understanding and patient
towards those aspects of myself I
didn’t like during my experience

… I feel like most other people
probably share these experiences
5. …I am trying to see my flaws as part
of the human condition
6. … I am giving myself the caring I
need
7. … I am trying to keep my emotions in
balance
8. … I think about my inadequacies and
feel alone in my failures
9. …I tend to obsess and fixate on
everything that was wrong
10. … I am reminding myself that
feelings of inadequacy are shared by
most people
11. …I am disapproving and judgmental
about my experience
12. …I am intolerant and impatient
towards aspects of my speech I don’t
like
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Appendix C – Study 3
Self-Affirmation Manipulation – Phase 1
Below is a list of characteristics and values, some of which may be important to you, some
of which may be unimportant. Please rank these values and qualities in order of their
importance to you, from 1-13 (1 = most important item, 13 = least important item). Use
each number only once.
_____Artistic skills/aesthetic appreciation
_____Sense of humor
_____Relationships with friends/family
_____Spontaneity/living life in the moment
_____Social skills
_____Athletics
_____Musical ability/appreciation
_____Physical attractiveness
_____Creativity
_____Academic skills
_____Romance
_____Religion
_____Other (please list:__________________)
Phase 2 - Self-Affirmation Condition
Consider your top ranked value (the value most important to you – ranked number 1).
•

Describe why this value is important to you and how it has made you feel good
about yourself.
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Phase 2 – Control Condition

Consider your bottom ranked value (the value least important to you – ranked number 12).
•

Describe why you think this value might be important to somebody else.

Manipulation Check
Rate how much you agree with the following statement from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).
1) The value I wrote about is very important to me.
Not at all
important
1
2
3
4

5

6

Extremely
important
7
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